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In the past decade courts have faced the difficult task of ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence derived from a wide range of newly ascertained or 
applied scientific principles. Neutron activation analysis, 1 sound spectrometry 
(voiceprints), 2 psycholinguistics, 3 atomic absorption, 4 remote electromagnetic 
sensing, 5 and bitemark complli-isons 6 are but a sample of the kinds of scientific 
evidence inundating the courts. i In addition, prior rulings on the admissibility 
of scientific evidence have been challenged. In some cases, previously rejected 
techniques, such as polygraph and hypnotic evidence, have gained admissibil-
l. E.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 
(1971); State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 
443 (1971). See generally Annat., 50 A.L.R.3d 117 (1973); Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of 
Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 997 (1971). 
2. E.g., United-States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cei1. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 
(1979); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Annat., 97 
A.L.R.3d 294 (1980); 0. Tosi, Voice Identification: Theory and Legal Applications 135-50 (1979). 
The National Academy of Sciences sponsored a comprehensive study of voiceprint identification, see 
National Research Council, On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification 38-57 ( 1979) [here-
inafter cited as National Academy of Sciences]. 
3. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). See generally Niblett & Bareham, Cluster Analysis 
in Court, 1976 Crim. L. Rev. 175; Comment, Stylistics Evidence in the Trial of Patricia Hearst, 
1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 387. 
4. See Chatom v. Stl)te, 348 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), rev'd, 348 So. 2d 838 (Ala.), 
acq. 348 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Chatman, !56 N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 
(App. Div. 1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979); State v. Crowder, 285 
N.C. 42, 203 S.E.2d 38 (1974), modified on other grounds, 428 U.S. 903 (1976). See generally 
Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances by Instrumental Analysis, 22 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts 385, 476-87 ( 1969). -
5. E.g., United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (forward looking infrared sys-
tem). See generally Latin, Tannehill & White, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law, 64 
Cll. L. Rev. 1300 (1976). 
6. E.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975): State v. Peoples, 
227 Kan. 127, 605 P.2d 135 (1980). See generally Note, The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 
51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 309 (1978); Anno!., 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977). 
7. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 54! (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis); United 
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (flux-gate magnetometer); United States v. 
Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic analysis of ink); People v. Palmer, 80 
Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978) (scanning electron microscopic analysis); Reid v. State, 
267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978) (trace metal detection technique); Smith v. State, 31 Md. 
App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976) (psychological stress evaluation); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 
Mass. 149, 310 N .E.2d 353 (1974) (identification of human remains through x-ray comparison); 
State v. Sharbono, 174 Mont. 552, 563 P.2d 61 (1977) (gaschrome-biographic analysis); State v. 
Boyington, 153 N.J. Super. 252, 379 A.2d 486 (App. Div. 1977) (Decatur Ragun); State v. Smith, 
50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976) (modified Harrison-Gilroy test for gunshot residue); 
State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 497 ( 1973) (trace metal detection technique); 
Hernandez v. State, 530 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (ultra-violet and infrared spectro-
graphic analysis). 
See generally A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases (2d ed. 1978); 
Kenety. The Physchological Stress Evaluator; The Theory, Validity and Legal Status of an Innovative 
"Lie Detector," 55 Ind. L.J. 349 (1980). 
With some types of novel scientific evidence, only the forensic application of the lechnique is 
new. Neutron activation analysis, for example, was well established as a method of elemental 
analysis before evidence based on this technique was presented in court. In contrast, sound spec-
trometry (voiceprints) was in an embryonic stage when first presented in court. 
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ity. 8 In other cases, some well-accepted scientific techniques, such as radar 9 
and certain drug-testing procedures, 10 have been challenged successfully. 
Several factors may have contributed to the ever-increasing use of sci'entific 
evidence. The creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA) in 1968 undoubtedly played a significant role. 11 The LEAA has un-
derwritten a number of research projects designed to encourage the forensic ap-
plication of scientific knowledge, and the admissibility of some novel 
techniques can be traced directly to this research. 12 Moreover, many commen-
tators 13 attribute the developing importance of scientific evidence to the Supreme 
Court's decisions of the 1960's, in wh-ich the Court, severely restricting the ac-
quisition of evidence for criminal cases via traditional crime-solving techniques 
such as interrogation 14 and lineups, 15 suggested as an alternative the use of 
8. Many courts have reversed their previous position and now admit the results of polygraph 
examinations upon stipulation of the parties. See J. Reid & F. lnbau, Truth and Deception 325-35 
(2d ed. 1977); Annat., 43 A.L.R. Fed. 68 (1979); Annat., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). In addition, 
several courts have held polygraph evidence admissible without a stipulation. See United States v. 
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975); 
State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. 1977). 
For cases admitting hypnotic evidence, see United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). See.gener-
ally Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 
38 Ohio St. L.J. 567 (1977); Annat., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 ( 1979). 
9. See State v. Aguilera, 25 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2189 (Dade County Ct. Fla. 1979). See 
generally Trichter & Patterson, Police Radar 1980: Has the Black Box Lost Its Magic?, 11 St. 
Mary's L.J. 829 (1980); Schuon, Police Radar Examined Amid Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1979, 
§ C, at I , col. I. 
10. See State v. Vail,-Minn.-, 274 N.W.2d 127 (1979) (upholding a trial court's ruling that 
common laboratory tests for marihuana failed to establish identity of seized substance); cf. State v. 
Wind, 60 Wis. 2d 267, 272, 208 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1973) (tests admissible, but insufficient standing 
alone to support conviction). See generally Stein, 'Laessig & lndriksons, An Evaluation of Drug 
Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of their Analysts, 1973 
Wis. L Rev. 727. 
II. The LEAA was created by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976). 
12. As examples of research projects underwritten by the LEAA, see B. Culliford, The Examina-
tion and Typing of Bloodstains in the Crime Laboratory (1971); H. McDonell, Flight Characteristics 
and Stain Patterns of Human Blood (1971); Trace Metal Detection Technique in Law Enforcement 
(1970); Michigan State Police, Voice Identification Research (1972); D. Raskin, G. Barland & J. 
Podlesny, Validity and Reliability of Detection of Deception ( 1978). 
The LEAA research on voiceprints has played a crucial role in the cases involving the admissi-
bility of this technique. See note 2 supra. 
13. See Kelley, Foreword to R. Fox and C. Cunningham, Crime Scene Search and Physical 
Evidence Handbook at iii (1973); Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in The Prosecutor's Desk-
book 547 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971); Fox, McDaniel & Howell, The Criminalistics Mission: 
A Comment, in Legal Medicine Annual 103, 113 (C. Wecht, ed. 1975); Osterburg, Forensic Science 
and the United States Supreme Court: The Impact and Significance of Past Decisions, in Legal 
Medicine Annual I at I (C. Wecht ed. 1972) ("The Miranda, Gideon, Escobedo, and several other 
cases of similar import, indirectly created an entirely new approach to criminal investigation. This 
has been particularly true with regard to the use and application of the various forensic sci-
ences .... "). 
See also Worley v. State, 263 So.2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (concurring opinion) 
("In this day and age ... where recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish 
stringent guidelines in the investigative, custodial and prosecutional areas a premium is placed upon 
the development and use of scientific methods of crime detection."). 
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
15. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel applies to lineups); Stovall 
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 ( 1967) (due process applies to identification procedures). 
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"extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." 16 Fi-
nally, the use of scientific knowledge to solve legal problems has long been 
recognized, 17 and it is not surprising that a society so dependent on science and 
technology should turn to such knowledge as a method of proof. 
The important point, however, is not the cause. of this development, but 
rather that the use of scientific evidence will continue and will likely increase. 
This Article explores one aspect of this development-the evidentiary standards 
employed by courts to determine the admissibility of evidence based upon novel 
scientific techniques. The general requirements for the admissibility of evidence 
derived from a scientific procedure or technique are discussed in Part I. The 
standard used most often by the courts-the general acceptance test of Frye l'. 
United Szmes 18 - is examined in detail in Part II. Next, the relevancy standard 
and other alternatives are considered. Finally, the Article proposes a solution 
designed to promote the use of scientific advances while avoiding the problems 
identified with Fl)'e and its suggested replacements. 
1. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTJFIC EVIDENCE 
For evidence to contribute to the truth-determining function of a trial, it 
must be reliable. The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific principle 1 v 
Interestingly, while the Court was erecting procedural barriers to the use. of confessions and 
lineups, it was removing fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment obstacles to the use of scientific evi-
dence. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. l (1973), ~nd United States v. Mara, ..JIO U.S. 19 
(1973), the Court held that physical characteristics such as handwriting and the sound of a person's 
voice fell outside the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
Court also held that compelled production of voice and handwriting exemplars pursuant to a grand 
jury subpoena did not constitute a seizure of the person within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court ruled that the seizure of "mere evidence" 
was not prohibited by the fourth amendment. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721. 727 
( 1969) (suggesting that the seizure of a person, on less than probable cause, for the purpose of 
obtaining fingerprints may not violate fourth amendment guarantees under certain circumstances). 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (!966). the Court held that the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination applied only to testimonial or communicative evidence and not tu phys-
ical evidence. Thus, the police could extract blood from Schmerber for blood-alcohol analysis witll-
out violating the fifth amendillent privilege. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 5-7 
(1973) (compelled production of voice exemplars does not violate fifth amendment); Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (compelled production of handwriting exemplars does not 
violate fifth amendment). 
While the Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to lineups in Wade, it refused to 
recognize such a right when handwriting exemplars were involved. See Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263, 267 (1967). In addition, the obtaining of forensic evidence in most cases occurs before the 
right to counsel has attached. See Kirby v. lllinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 ( 1972) (right to counsel 
attaches at the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings). 
16. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,488-89 (1964). See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 
432, 439 ( 1957) ("Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime detection 
lest the public go unprotected."). 
17. See generally Scientists in- the Legai System (\V. Thomas ed. IY74); Korn, La\:v, Fact. and 
Science in the Courts, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1080 (1966); Martin, The Proposed "Science Court." 75 
Mich. L. Rev. I 058 ( 1977); Whitney, Technical and Scientific Evidence in Administrative Adjudica-
tion, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 37 (1976). 
18. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. i923). 
19. Scientific knowledge can be used in two distinct ways at trial. Firsi, data ordinarily unavail-
able to lay persons can be obtained by scientific means. For example, a stain found at a murder 
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depends upon three factors: (1) the validity 20 of the underlying principle, (2) the 
validity of the technique applying that principle, 21 and (3) the proper application 
of the technique on a particular occasion. This last factor requires an examina-
tion 22 of the condition of any instrumentation employed in the technique, 23 
scene can be analyzed by a serologist to· determine whether the stain is blood and, if human blood, 
the type. Secondly, scientific knowledge may supply the general proposition or hypothesis needed to 
evaluate specific data. Evidence that the defendant's blood type matches the type found at the crime 
scene is relevant only because scientific research has demonstrated that the general population can be 
classified according to blood type. Therefore, evidence that the blood found at the crime scene and 
the defendant's blood are the same type tends to make the existence of a material or consequential 
fact, i.e., the murderer's identity, more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Strong, 
Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L.F. I, 2-4. 
Because scientific knowledge is beyond the expertise of most judges and juries, expert witnesses 
are used to supply general scientific propositions. An evolutionary process, however, is involved; at 
some point much of what is initially classified as "scientific" knowledge is assimilated into general 
knowledge and an expert is no longer needed to supply these propositions. See J. Maguire, Evidence 
30 (1947). 
In many cases the specific data as well as the general proposition will be supplied by an expert. 
For e!'ample, a firearms identification examiner may offer an opinion that two bullets match. This 
involves testimony concerning specific data-striations found on the suspect and test bullets are 
identical-and the general proposition that no two bullets could possess identical striations unless 
fired from the same weapon. In other cases, the expert may supply only the specific data or the 
general proposition. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 417a (3d ed. 1940) 
[hereinafter cited as J. Wigmore, Evidence]; Strong, supra, at 6. 
20. Although courts use the terms "validity" and "reliability" interchangeably, the terms have 
distinct meanings in scientific jargon. "Validity" refers to the ability of a test procedure to measure 
what it is supposed to measure-its accuracy. "Reliability" refers to whether the same results are 
obtained in each instance in which the test is performed-its consistency. Validity includes reliabil-
ity, but the converse is not necessarily true. See Barland, The Reliability of Polygraph Chart Evalua-
tions, 'in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 120; 121 (N. Ansley ed. 1975). 
21. See Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 5, at 1403-10; Strong. supra note 19, at 15-18. 
22. See 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 795, at 245-46 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (listing foundational 
prerequisites for X-ray evidence); J. Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof § 220, at 449-50 (3d ed. 
1937). 
23. If a scientific procedure involves instrumentation, the accuracy of results derived from that 
procedure depends on the functioning of the instrument at the time of the tt,:st. Similarly, if a proce-
dure involves the use of reagents or chemicals, the condition of those supstances at the time of the 
test may affect the outcome. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Mich. 1972) 
(polygraph); People v. Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 559,561, 131 Cal. Rptr. 190, 191 (1976) 
(breathalyzer); State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Mo.) (neutron activation analysis), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 994 (1971); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Mo. 1968) ("paraffin" test). See also 
J. Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof 450 (3d ed. 1937). This requirement is imposed by statute in 
some jurisdictions. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.1905(1) (Harrison) (radar); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3368(d) (Purdon) (radar); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3368(b) (Purdon) (speedometer). 
Various methods of proof have been used to establish the condition of instrumentation employed 
in scientific procedures. See State v. McDonough, 302 Minn. 468, 225 N. W .2d 259 ( 1975) (use of 
tuning fork to establish condition of radar). Cf. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (custom and practice sufficient to establish condition of flux-gate magnetometer); 
People v. Jones, 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct., Traffic Ct. 1958) 
(evidence of periodic testing to establish condition of speedometer); Whitehead v. City of Lynchburg, 
213 Va. 742, 195 S.E.2d 858 (1973) (test run by a vehicle with calibrated speedometer to establish 
condition of radar). 
Some courts, however, take the position that the condition of the instrument affects the weight, 
not the admissibility, of the evidence. E.g., People v. Abdallah, 82 Ill. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 
408 (1967) (dictum); People v. Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 155 N.E.2d 393, 181 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1959). 
See C. McCormick, Evidence § 210, at 514-16 (2d ed. 1972). 
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adherence to proper procedures, 2 '1 the qualifications of the person conducting the 
procedure, 25 and the qualifications of the person interpreting the results. 26 For 
example, voiceprint identification is premised on the uniqueness of the human 
voice. 27 If the theory of voice uniqueness is not valid, voiceprint evidence is 
not reliable. If, however, the uniqueness of the human voice were established, it 
would not necessarily follow that the voiceprint technique is capable of detecting 
that uniqueness. Finally, assuming a valid theory and technique, a defective in-
strument (sound spectrograph), an unqualified operator' or a failure to follow 
prescribed procedures, may also produce unreliable results. 
The first two factors- the validity of the underlying principle and the valid-
ity ?f the technique-are critical only with regard to the admissibility of evi-
dence derived from -a novel scientific technique. Once a technique is sufficiently 
established, a court may take judicial notice of the principle and the technique, 28 
thereby relieving the offering party of the burden of producing evidence on these 
24. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976) 
("[t]he proponent of the [voiceprint] evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures 
were used in the particular case."); accord, United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972); United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570, 574 (E.D_ Pa. 197]). 
In some jurisdictions a showing of the analyst's qualifications raises a presumption that the 
analyst used the proper procedures. People v. Meikrantz, 77 Misc. 2d 892, 896, 351 N.Y.S.2d 549, 
556 (Broome County Ct. 1974). In other jurisdictions a checklist of the procedures employed may be 
introduced to corroborate the analyst's testimony. State v. Hamaker, 524 S. W .2d 176, 178 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1975); State v. Sutton, 253 Or. 24, 450 P.2d 748 (1969). 
Some courts, however, have taken the position that the methods employed in performing a test 
affect the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 
438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 418-19, 
260 A.2d 547, 558-59 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In contrast, other courts 
have excluded evidence because the procedures were not acceptable. See Latin, Tannehill & White, 
supra note 5, at 1405-06. 
25. Sec United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200, 208 (D. Md. 1957) (radar equipment 
"manned by a competent operator"); State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42, 50, 203 S.E.2d 38, 44 (1974) 
(police officer who collected evidence for atomic absorption analysis "qualified by training and 
experience to perform that simple task"); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 795. at 245 (Chadbourn rev. 
1970). 
26. In many instances the person who conducts the test also interprets 1he resulls. Firearms 
itlenlification, fingerprint identification, and drug analysis arc illustralive lechnigues. Olher methods 
involve lwo experts. In these cases courts must "differentiate belween abilily to operale an instru-
ment or perform a test and the ability to make an interpretalion drawn from use of the instrumenl.'' 
People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 457, 72 Cal. Rplr. 4 78. 491 ( 1968) _ For example, a lechni-
cian operates the x-ray machine, but a physician interprets the x-rays. Bolh musl be qualified. Simi-
larly, a police officer could qualify as an expert in the operation of a brealhalyzer, but would nol 
have the requisite expertise to interpret the results. A physician would have lo 1es1ify aboul the 
relationship between the alcohol content of the breath and the effect on !he brain, unless a statute 
creates a presumption of intoxication when the alcohol concentralion reaches a specified level. See 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.19 (Baldwin) (1975). See generally 3 1. Wigmore, Evidence § 795, al 
245-46 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Latin, Tannehill & White, supra nole 5, al 1366-67, 1370; Strong, 
supra note 19, at 9 n.27. 
27. More specifically, the validity of voiceprints depends on the extem to which inlerspeaker 
variability (how one person's voice differs from another's) exceeds inlraspeaker variability (how one 
person differs in the way he pronounces the same word each lime he says il)_ See Nalional Academy 
of Sciences, supra note 2, at 10; Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash. Experimem on 
Voice Identification 51 1. Acoust. Soc'y Am. 2030, 2031 ( 1972). 
28. See C. McCormick. supra note 23, at 763; I J. \Veinslein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence 11 200[05] (1979); Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense Aboul Judicial N01ice. 2 
Sian. L. Rev. 664, 670-71 (1950); Strong, supra nole 19, al 15. 
1980] SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1203 
issues. The principles underlying radar, 29 intoxication tests, 30 fingerprints, 31 
firearms identifications,32 and handwriting comparisons 33 have all been judi-
cially recognized in this fashion. In some cases, the validity of a technique-
radar and intoxication tests are the principal examples-has been recognized 
legislatively. 34 As with judicial notice, legislative recognition relieves the propo-
nent of scientific evidence of the burden of introducing evidence on the validity 
issue. A new technique, however, is rarely so well established that a court would ~ 
take judicial notice of its validity the first time evidence derived from the 
technique is offered at trial. 35 Consequently, the validity of a new technique is 
typically established through the introduction of evidence including expert tes-
timony.36 
Courts have relied principally on two alternative tests to determine the ad-
missibility of innovative scientific evidence. One approach, often associated with 
Professor McCormick, treats the validity of the underlying principle and the va-
lidity of the technique as aspects of relevancy. 37 If, for example, everyone's 
voice is not unique, the results of voiceprint analysis will not tend to establish 
the identity of a speaker. Or, if fear of detection does not produce certain 
physiological reactions, the results of polygraph examinations will not tend to 
establish whether the subject of the examination was being deceptive. 38 Simi-
larly, if the principles underlying polygraph examinations and voiceprint identifi-
cations are valid but the techniques applying those principles are not valid, evi-
29. E.g., United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957); State v. Tomanelli, 153 
Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); People v. 
Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958). See also State v. Finkle, 128 
N.J. Super. 199, 319 A.2d 733 (App. Div.) (VASCAR), aff'd, 66 N.J. 139, 329 A.2d 65 (1974), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). 
30. E.g., People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill. App. 2d 344, 185 N.E.2d 381 (1962) (breathalyzer); State 
v. Miller, 64 N.J. Super. 262, 165 A.2d 829 (App. Div. 1960) (drunkometer); People v. Donaldson, 
36 A.D.2d 37, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1971) (breathalyzer). 
31. E.g., Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664 (1936); 
State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951); Grice v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 4, 151 
S.W.2d 211 (1941). 
32. E.g., State v. Hackett, 215 S.C. 434, 55 S.E.2d 696 (1949). 
33. E.g., Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126 (1924); Fenelon v. State, 195 Wis. 416, 
217 N.W. 711 (1928). 
34. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 75-1031.1 (1979); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.§ 10-301,307 
(1980); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law§ 1195 (Canso!.) (Supp. 1976); N.D. Cent. Code§ 39-20-07(5) 
(1980); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.091 (Baldwin) (1975); Utah Cod~ Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
1979); Va. Code § 46.1-198 (1974); Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act, 9 U.L.A. 61 
(Supp. 1967). See also People v. Williams, !64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958) (legislative recognition of Nalline test). 
35. Although rare, it is possible for a court to take judicial notice of the validity of a new 
technique in a case of first impression. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971) (judicial notice of validity of magnetometer; expert testimony also received).· See also People 
v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978) (scanning electron microscopic analysis). 
See text accompanying notes !42-51 infra. 
36. See, e.g., Tiffin v. Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 170, 290 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Tiffin Mun. 
Ct. 1970) ("Because the instrument [VAS CAR] is new, expert testimony as to the scientific princi-
ple, construction, operation, accuracy and reliability of the device must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt."). 
37. See text accompanying notes 276-87 infra. 
38. For a discussion of the theory of the polygraph, see J. Reid & F. lnbau, supra note 8; 
Bar! and & Raskin, Detection of Deception in Electrodermal Activity in Psychological Research 417. 
445-47 (W. Prokasy & D. Raskin eds. 1973). 
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dence derived from those techniques will be irrelevant. Under the relevancy ap-
proach, novel scientific evidence is treated the same as other kinds of evidence. 
Thus, if an expert testifies that an innovative technique is ·valid, a court could 
find that evidence derived from that technique is probative. Admissibility, how-
ever, would not be automatic. As with all relevant evidence, a court would have 
discretion to exclude the evidence if the probative value were outweighed by 
considerations of undue prejudice, misleading the jury, and undue consumption 
of timea~ 
The admissibility of evidence derived from novel scientific techniques has 
not always been analyzed according to the relevancy approach. Indeed, at a 
rather early stage in the use of scientific evidence most courts adopted the stan-
dard proposed by Frye v. United States, 40 a 1923 decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Because this case has so deeply affected 
the admissibility of scientific information, the Frye test and its consequences will 
be examined in detail. 
11. Frye v. United States 
In Frve the D.C. Circuit considered the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence 41 as a case of first impression. 42 In an oft-quoted passage,"13 the court 
commented: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be 
recognized, and while the courts \Vill go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
39. See C. McConnick, supra note 23 at 49!. See also Fed. R. Evid. 403. Several commen-
tators have argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence codify this approach. See text accompanying 
notes 240-57 infra. 
40. 293 F. I 013 (D. C. Cir. 1923). 
41. The machine used in Frye was a forerunner of the modern polygraph and is more accurately 
described as a monograph, since, unlike the modern polygraph, it measured only one physiological 
response- blood pressure. 
42. ln a 1927 article Professor McCormick referred· to Frye as "the only decision on the point 
that has come to my attention." McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, I 5 Cal. L. 
Rev. 484, 499 (1927). He also provides details of the trial that do not appear in the reported opinion. 
ld. at 499 n.49. Frve was noted at 24 Colum. L. Rev. 429 (1924); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1138 (1924); 
28 Law Notes 64 (1924); 2 N.Y.L. Rev. 206 (1924); 33 Yale L.J. 771, 773 (1924); Annot.. 34 
A.L.R. 147 (1925). 
The defendant in F1ye was subsequently pardoned when someone else confessed to the crime. 
See \Vicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 711, 715 
(1953), citing Fourteenth Annual Report of Judicial Council of the State of New York 265 (1948). 
Although Frye has been employed most frequently as the standard for determining the admissi-
bility of novel scientific techniques through expert testimony, this has not been its exclusive use. ln 
State v. Cary. 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 
( 1970). the court seemed to use the Frye test as the standard for judicially noticing the validity of 
voiceprint evit.ience "[B]efore a court can take judicial notice of a scientific process there must be 
general scientific acceptance .... " !d. at 333, 239 A.2d at 685. Cary has been criticized because it 
seems to suggest that scientific evidence is admissible only if it satisfies the standards for judicial 
notice. See Strong, supra note 19, at 9 n.28. 
43. See, e.g., Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, 
in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 14, 15 (N. Ansley ed. 1975) (the general acceptance test is 
"probably the most widely quoted portion of any decision involving novel scientific tests results"). 
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discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs. 44 
The court went on to hold that the polygraph had ''not yet gained such standing 
arid scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities.'' 45 
In effect, Frye envisions an evolutionary process leading to the admissibility 
of scientific evidence. A novel technique must pass through an "experimental" 
stage in which it is scrutinized by the scientific community. Only after the 
technique has been tested successfully in this stage and has passed into the "de-
monstrable" stage wiJI it receive judicial recognition. What is unique about the 
Frye opinion is the standard it establishes for distinguishing between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages. 46 In contrast to the relevancy approach, it 
is not enough that a qualified expert, or even several experts, believes that a 
particular technique has entered the demonstrable stage; Frye imposes a special 
burden-the technique must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community. 
In its brief two-page opinion, the Frye court neither cited authority nor 
offered an explanation for adopting the general acceptance standard. Nonethe-
less, the Frye test has dominated the admissibility of scientific evidence for more 
than half a centuryY In addition to polygraph evidence, it has been used to 
determine the admissibility of evidence derived from voiceprints, 48 neutron acti-
vation analysis, 49 gunshot residue tests, 50 bitemark comparisons, 51 sodium pen-
44. 293 F. at 1014. 
45. ld. 
46. The evolutionary process described in the text would still be possible without the Frye test. 
For example, the court in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), described a 
similar process while ignoring the Frye test. See also 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 5168, at 88-89 (1978). Typically, scientific evidence progresses through several 
stages of development: (I) an experimental stage, (2) a demonstrable stage in which expert testimony 
is used to establish the validity of the technique, and (3) a demonstrable stage in which the technique 
is so well established that a court could take judicial notice of its validity. There may also be a fourth 
stage. Some techniques may become so commonplace that neither expert testimony nor judicial 
notice is required. See J. Maguire, supra note 19, at 30 ("Only a few years ago it would have been 
necessary to take expert evidence on issues with respect to the operati.on of motor cars, airplanes, or 
radio which are now so completely inside the domain of popul¥ understanding that such evidence 
would be rejected as superfluous."). 
47. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) ("This criterion of 'general 
acceptance' in the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in the 
country which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence."). Accord, 
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, supra 
note 7, at 6. But see R. Lempert & S. Saltz burg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 934-35 & 935 
n.ll ( 1977) (questioning influence of Frye test). 
48. E.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741", 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Frye); People v. 
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 31, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 14"8, 149 (1976) 
(citing Frye); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386 passim, 391 A.2d 364, 381 passim (1978) (citing 
Frye). . 
49. E.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436, 438, 441 {6th Cir. 1970) (citing Frye), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Mo .. 1972) (citing Frye). 
50. See State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 193, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1976) (modified 
Harrison-Gilroy technique not generally accepted; citing Frye). 
51. E.g., People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 623, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (1978) (citing 
Frye); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 394-98, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1356-60 (1976) (citing and 
distinguishing Frye). 
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tothal, 52 scanning electron microscopic analysis, 53 and numerous other forensic 
technigues. 54 Unfortunately, in most instances judicial adoption of the general 
acceptance standard has not been accompanied by a supporting rationale. This is 
especially true of the early cases, which often cite Frye without comment or 
analysis. 55 As late as 1972 a federal district court could conectly observe that 
"[t]here is notably an absence of any discussion of the 'general acceptance' stan-
dard in federal decisions." 56 
Because of the avalanche of innovative procedures, 57 the advent of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 58 and the scathing attacks on the F1~ve test, 5 ~ courts 
52. E.g., Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956) (citing Frye); State v. 
Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 423, 132 A.2d 298, 306 (1957) (citing Frye); Henderson v. Stale. 94 Okla 
Crim. 45, 52, 55, 230 P.2d 495, 502,505 (citing Frye, and applying Frye standard to use of sodium 
pentothal), cen. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951). 
53. See People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252, !45 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1978) (citing 
Frye). 
54. E.g., United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362-63 (6th Cir.) ("no evidence as to the 
general acceptance of microscopic hair analysis in the scientific community'': applying Frye stan-
dard), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (!979); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir.) 
(psychiatric testimony, citing Frye), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Kilgus, 571 
F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (forward looking infrared system; citing Frye); United States v. 
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-57, 558 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis; citing Frye); Medley 
v. United States, 155 F.2d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir.) (spectroscopic analysis; citing Fr1'e), cert. denied. 
328 U.S. 873 (1946); United States v. Hearst, 4!2 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (psycholin-
guistics), aff'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d !331 (9th Cir. !977); United States v. Bruno, 333 F. 
Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic analysis of ink); Rivers v. Black. 259 Ala. 528, 
531, 68 So. 2d 2, 4 (1953) (drunkometer; citing Frye); Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 
653, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 388, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260, 262 (1966) (Kell-Cellano blood grouping 
tests; citing Frye); People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 860, 331 P.2d 251, 253 (App. 
Dep't Super. Ct. 1958) (Nalline test; citing Frye); People v. Zimmerman. 385 Mich: 417, 459-60, 
!89 N. W .2d 259, 278-79 (1971) (separate opinion, Williams. J.) (accident reconstruction evidence; 
citing Frye); People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 273-74, 38 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1949) (drunkometer; 
citing Frye); People v. Watkins, 78 Mich. App. 89, 96, 259 N.W.2d 381. 385 (1977) (microscopic 
comparison of hair samples; citing Frye); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 712, 3Y8 N.Y.S.2d 
503, 507 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (trace metal detection technique; applying general acceptance standard); 
People v. Alston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 1085, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (blond test; 
citing Frye); Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 273, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1974) (hair analysis; 
citing Frye). 
55. E.g., People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 219 P.2d 70, 72 .(1950), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 888 (1951); Boeche v. State, i5i Neb. 368, 377, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949); Henderson 
v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 52, 230 P.2d 495, 502, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); State v. 
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 657, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (1933). 
56. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 687 n.6 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D. C. 
Cir. 1972). 
57. See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra. 
58. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976)). 
The enactment of the Federal Rules in 1975 and their adoption by a number of states have sparked a 
lively debate. Some courts and commentators assume the Frve test has survived the enactment nf the 
Federal Rules, while others maintain the Federal Rules repea.l the Frye standard. See text accompany-
ing notes 240-57 infra. 
59. Commentators have not been restrained in their criticism of the Fne test. See Moenssens, 
supra note 43, at 19 ("archaic"); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 87 ("a 'sport'"): 
Conrad, Landmarks and Hallmarks in Scientific Evidence, in Sourcebook in Criminalistics 37. 38 (C. 
Hormachea ed. 1974) ("amiguated on the day of its pronouncement"); Tarlow, Admissibility of 
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adhering to the general acceptance standard have begun to set forth a supporting 
rationale. 60 Their main arguments are, first, that the general acceptance stan-
dard guarantees that "a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically 
examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case;" 61 second, 
that the Frye test "may well promote a degree of uniformity of decision;" 62 and 
third, that the test eliminates the need for time-consuming hearings on the valid-
ity of innovativ_<:: techniques. 63 The principal justification for the Frye test, 
however, is that it establishes a method for ensuring the reliability of scientific 
evidence. As the D.C. Circuit stated in a later case, "The requirement of general 
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess 
the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice." 64 
It is predominantly on the basis of this reliability argument that the Frye test 
must be judged. The other rationales, although important, can be satisfied under 
.other standards. 65 As the next section demonstrates, the problems Frye has 
Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 
Hastings L.J. 917, 923 & n.38 (1975) ("infamous"). For other critical reviews of Frye, see I D. 
Louise]] & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 820-26 (1977); C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 489-90; 
Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev. 313 (1964); 
Strong, supra note 19, at 10-15; Note, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scien-
tific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 757 (1979). But see Latin, Tannehill & White, 
supra note 5, at 1374-81; Note, The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, supra note 6; 64 Cornell 
L. Rev. 875 (1979). 
60. By shattering the myth of infallibility that has often shrouded scientific evidence, and by 
documenting the deficiencies in this country's crime laboratories, the Crime Laboratory Proficiency 
Testing Program may also have contributed to the reexamination of the Frye test. See J. Peterson, E. 
Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Program (1978). The program 
was a joint enterprise of the Forensic Sciences Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration. The report concluded: "During the course of the proficiency testing program, it was 
quickly recognized that many of the laboratories were experiencing difficulty in the examination and 
analysis of various physical evidence types." ld. at 261. The report also concluded "that crime 
laboratories have been and are still in need of help." Id. at 263. These conclusions confirmed views 
expressed in earlier reports. See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals, Police 304-05 (1973). 
61. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
62. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 
(1976) ("Individual judges whose particular conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of par-
ticular scientific evidence, may discover substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific com-
munity.''). 
63. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,388,391 A.2d 364,371-72 (1978) ("Without the Frye test or 
something similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique is likely to become a central 
issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long as there remains serious disagreement in the 
scientific community over its reliability."). See also State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, ·332, 239 
A.2d 680, 684 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). 
64. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also People v. 
Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977) ("It therefore is best to adhere to a 
standard [Frye] which in effect permits the experts who know most about a procedure to experiment 
and to study it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must first pass on the scientific 
status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact."); I D. Louise]] & 
C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 827; Strong, supra note 19, at 14; 64 Cornell L. Rev. 875, 881 (1979). 
65. The "reserve of experts" argument has merit. Nevertheless, the adoption of a less stringent 
test of admissibility could be accompanied by a requirement that the opposing party be provided with 
the opportunity to secure the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, thus guaranteeing a reserve of 
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engendered-the difficulties in applying the test and the anomalous results it 
creates-so far _outweigh these advantages that the argument for adopting a dif-
ferent test has become overwhelming. 
A. Difficulties in Application · 
To determine how well the Frye standard performs the function of ensuring 
the reliability of novel scientific evidence, it is necessary to consider the manner 
in which courts have applied the general acceptance standard. 
Courts applying the general acceptance test have discovered the need to 
define the parameters of the test more closely than the D.C. Circuit did in Frye. 
In particular, courts must decide who must find the procedure acceptable, they must 
define exactly what must be accepted, ~nd they must determine what methods 
will be used to establish genera] acceptance. Moreover, the types of evidence to 
which the Frye test is applicable must be identified. An additional problem of 
application involves the scope of appellate review. 
I. Who Must Accept the Procedure. The general acceptance standard as set 
forth in Frye appears to require a two-step analysis: first, identifying the field in 
which the underlying principle falls, 66 and second, determining whether that 
principle has been generally accepted by members of the identified field. 67 
Neither step is free of difficulties. 
a. Identifying the Appropriate Field. Many scientific techniques do not fall 
within the domain of a single academic discipline or professional field. 68 Con-
sequently, selecting the proper field may prove troublesome. More importantly, 
selection of the appropriate field may be dispositive. 69 The voiceprint cases 
illustrate these points. In People v. King 70 the court stated: "Communication by 
speech does riot fall within any one established category of science. Its under-
standing requires a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology and 
linguistics." 71 Because the expert produced by the prosecution-the developer 
experts who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case. 
Moreover, the test proposed as a substitute for Frye recognizes consumption of time as a factor in 
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. See text accompanying note 278 infra. Finally, 
the uniformity argument is difficult to support, because Frye has produced anything but consistent 
results. See text accompanying notes 159-86 infra. 
66. See People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("At 
the ·threshold of determining whether the technique meets the test of acceptance in the scientific 
community, is the question of defining that community."). 
67. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) ("A p~eliminary task is to define the phrase 'general acceptance.' The cases following the 
Frye rationale have been carefully considered and they offer little guidance."). 
68. Professor Moenssens has· written: "Deciding what is the proper field to which a novel test 
belongs is in itself a chore. Most novel tests represent new approaches to the solution of old prob-
lems by a process which is unknown, or belongs to a different field. Because of this, the person 
developing a novel test frequently finds himself on the fringes of his scientific discipline, and perhaps 
overlapping into other disciplines." Moenssens, supra note 43, at 17. See also Jones, Danger-
Voiceprints Ahead, I J Am. Crim. L. Rev. 549, 564-65 (1973); Strong, supra note 19, at 12. 
69. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d J 194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Selection of the 'relevant 
scientific community,' appears to influence the result."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. I J 17 (1979). 
70. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). 
71. ld. at 456, 72 Cal. Rpir. at 490. 
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of the technique-was not knowledgeable in all these areas, 72 the court rejected 
voiceprint evidence. Similar problems arise in connection with polygraph, 73 
bitemark/4 psycholinguistics, 75 and remote-sensing 76 evidence. 
Even when general agreement as to the relevant field exists, admissibility 
can be affected by choosing a subspecialty within that field. The leading case is 
People v. Williams, 77 in which the validity of the Nalline test for detecting 
narcotic use was considered. 78 Because the prosecution's own experts conceded 
that the "medical profession generally [was] unfamiliar with the use of 
Nalline ... , " 7 ~ the technique could not have satisfied the Frye test if the med-
ical profession had been selected as the appropriate field. 80 Nevertheless, the court 
upheld the admissibility of the evidence because the test had "been generally 
accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.'' 81 Ac-
cording to the court, in "this age of specialization more should not be re-
quired." 82 In effect, admissibility was achieved through a redefinition of the 
"field." This approach is not necessarily inconsistent with Frye, provided the 
"specialized field" is sufficiently large so that the Frye objective of receiving a 
consensus judgment of the scientific community can be met. 83 Such an ap-
proach, however, does highlight the malleable nature of the general acceptance 
standard. Moreover, if the "specialized field" is too narrow, the consensus 
72. After identifying the relevant fields in which general acceptance must be achieved, the court 
questioned the qualifications of the prosecution's expert, Lawrence Kersta, the developer of the 
voiceprint technique: "While Kersta has degrees in electrical engineering and physics, his field of 
knowledge is acoustical and audio engineering; there is no indication either from his educational 
background or his employment experience that he engaged in any scientific investigation or medical 
research to substantiate his analysis of the functions of the body which produce speech." ld. at 450, 
72 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87. · 
73. See Moenssens, supra note 43, at 17-18 ("Frye rather arbitrarily, relegates the polygraph to 
the discipline of psychology, a field in which it has unquestionably great application, but which is 
not necessarily the only field concerned or the best to develop the process."); Note, The Emergence 
of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1120, 1123 (1973). 
74. Compare People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385,395, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (1976) (citing 
the "medical profession" as the relevant field), with People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 625, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 69 (1978) (citing "dentistry" as the relevant field). 
75. See Comment, Stylistics Evidence in the Trial of Patricia Hearst. supra note 3, at 399 ("[A] 
discipline such as stylistics contains elements from many established sciences-such as mathematics, 
computer science, psychology, and linguistics .... "). 
76. See Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 5, at 1368 ("Remote sensing ... is not a self-
contained or easily recognizable discipline if evaluated in terms of the formal academic training of its 
proponents."). 
77. 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958). . 
78. Dilation of the pupils after the injection· of Nalline indicates the recent use of narcotics. ld. at 
860, 331 P.2d at 252-53. 
79. Id. at 862, 331 P.2d at 253. 
80. See Maietskos & Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court, in Law En-
forcement Science & Technology 957, 960 (S.A. Yefsky ed. 1967) ('"Under the traditional readings 
of Frye v. United States, it would have been appropriate to exclude the Nalline test result>."). 
81. 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 862, 331 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). 
82. Id. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit held voiceprint evidence inadmissible because it had not 
been accepted by the "scientific community as a whole." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 
745 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). 
83. See I D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 824-25. 
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judgment mandated by Frye becomes illusory; the judgment of the scientific 
community becomes, in reality, the opinion of a few experts. 84 
The Williams modification of Frye has also spawned other problems. In 
Commonwealth v. Lykus 85 the court, after citing Williams, 86 stated: "[The] Frye 
I 
standard does not require unanimity of view, only general acceptance; a degree 
of scientific divergence of view is inevitable. In this case we are disposed to 
give greater weight to those experts who have had direct and empirical experi-
ence in the field of spectrography [ voicepri~ts]." 87 Although this approach 
may appear to be an application of Williams-defining as a subspecialty those 
with "direct and empirical experience" -it differs significantly from Williams. 
In Williams the medical profession as a whole was not considered the appropriate 
field because most members of that profession were "unfamiliar" with the Nal-
line test. In contrast, the Lykus court· did not exclude those who were "unfamil-
iar" with voiceprints; instead, it excluded those whose knowledge was "theoret-
ical." 88 Consequently, the opinions of experts with extensive backgrounds in 
speech science were discarded. 89 As one court has observed: "The purpose of 
the Frye test is_ defeated by an approach which allows a court to ignore the 
informed opinions of a substantial segment of the scientific community which 
stands in opposition to the process in question.'' 90 
b. General Acceptance in the Field. Once the relevant field or scientific 
community has been identified, a court applying Frye must determine whether 
the underlying principle and technique have been "generally accepted" by mem-
bers of that field. The percentage of those in the field who must accept the 
H4. The Williams approach has been adopt,ed by a number of courts and cited approvingly by 
some commentators. See Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778,790-91, !06 Cal. Rptr. 547, 
554 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lykus,367 Mass. 191, 203, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677-78 (1975); People 
v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 881, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 237(Sup. Ct. 1976); I D. Louise]] & C. 
Mueller, supra note 59, at 824; A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, ·supra note 7, at 5-6. 
85. 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). · 
86. !d. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 678 (quoting People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 
861-62, 331 P.2d at 253-54). 
87. !d. at 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. 
88. !d. 
89. The experts whose views were rejected constituted a committee of the Acoustical Society of 
America. See Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech 
Spectrograms: Some Further Observations, 54 J. Acoust. Soc'y Am. 531 (1973). The Committee had 
earlier reviewed the subject of voiceprint analysis. See Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Ste-
vens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: A Scientist's View of its Reliability for Legal 
Purposes, 47 J. Acoust. Soc'y Am. 597 (1970). Several·of these authors served on the National 
Academy of Sciences committee that studied voiceprint identification. See National Academy of 
Sciences, supra note 2. It can hardly be said that these scientists had nothing to contribute to the 
subject. 
90. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978). The trial court in Reed had 
followed theLykus approach. See State v. Reed, 18 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2011,2012 (Montgomery 
County Cir. Ct. 1975) ("[W]e are restricting the relevant field of experts to those who are know-
ledgeable, directly knowledgeable through work, utilization of the techniques, experimentation and so 
forth, [and] we are not taking the broad general scientific community of speech and hearing sci-
ence."). See also People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1978) 
(refusing to limit the field "to those scientists who actually employ the spectrograph for voice iden-
tification"). 
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technique has never been clearly delineated. 91 Most courts applying Frye have 
not addressed the issue adequately; they have either ignored it altogether or of-
fered rather general statements. For example, one court has defined general ac-
ceptance as "widespread; prevalent; extensive though not universal." 92 
Another court has conceded that "a degree of scientific divergence of view is 
inevitable,'' 93 without elaborating on how much divergence would be disposi-
tive. 94 Again, the latitude allowable to a court under the malleable Frye stan-
dard could yield the admission of evidence that a large segment of the scientific 
community would find unacceptable. 95 
2. What must be accepted. It is unresolved whether the Frye standard re-
quires general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the underlying 
principle and the technique applying it. 96 According to one commentator, 
"[t]he language of Frye seems to require acceptance of the underlying theory 
and not just of the technique itself." 97 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit apparently has accepted this view. 98 Although some decisions refer to 
general acceptance of the "procedure," 99 "technology," 100 or "scientific 
9!. Profes§or Strong has observed:- "The resulting standard, something greater than acceptance 
by the expert himself but less than acceptance by all experts in the field, is obviously somewhat 
lacking in definiteness." Strong, supra note I 9, at I I. 
92. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
93. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (1975). 
94. See also People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 711-12, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 370 (Sup. Ct. 
1978) ("The Court notes that it has not been necessary to determine the point at which opposition to 
a given scientific theory recedes into a minority view, and acceptance of such a theory becomes 
general."). 
95. One commentator has written that the Frye standard requires acceptance by a "substantial 
majority." J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence 164 (2d ed. I 974). This standard should be 
distinguished from a "substantial" acceptance test, which has apparently been applied by some 
courts, because acceptance could be substantial without representing a majority of scientists in a 
particular field. See United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acceptance 
by a "substantial section of the scientific community"), aff'd, 583 F.2d I I 94 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. I I 17 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, !53 n.3, 310 N.E.2d 353, 
356 n.3 (1974) ("substantial authority" required). 
96. The Frye court did not state explicitly whether the general acceptance test applied only to the 
underlying theory or to the technique as well. In discussing this issue, one commentator has re-
marked: "The [Frye] court's prior discussion had indicated that the 'thing from which the deduction 
is made' might be either the general proposition that there is a connection between conscious insin-
cerity and changes in blood pressure, or some proposition relating to the ability of an expert to 
interpret such data." C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 489. 
97. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 4!. See also 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, 
supra note 46, at 95 ("As in Frye, the decisions turn on the scientific acceptance of the 
theory .... "). 
98. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The Frye standard ... 
requires that the '[theory] from which the deduction is made be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' ") (brackets in original). See 
also United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (Frye requires "general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the theory underlying such technique"); People v. 
Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 712, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 370 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
99. People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 84, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 718 (1974). 
100. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 
(1971). 
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technique," 101 it is doubtful that these references reflect a conscious choice with 
regard to this issue. If both the underlying principle and the technique must be 
generally accepted, some types of scientific evidence, such as voiceprints, would 
be readily excluded. 1 02 
Resolving this issue involves focusing on the distinction between the valid-
ity of a technique and the validity of its underlying theory. 103 One could ac-
cept, for instance, the validity of the premise underlying voiceprint 
identification-voice uniqueness-but still reject the validity of the voiceprint 
technique. Similarly, the underlying psychological and physiological principles 
of polygraph evidence could be acknowledged without endorsing the proposition 
that a polygraph examiner can detect deception by means of the polygraph 
technique. 
A novel forensic technique, however, may involve either the new applica-
tion of a well-established theory or the application of a new theory. ln the latter 
case, the theory can be validated only empirically or inferentially, not deduc-
tively.10·l In other words, the successful application of the technique proves the 
validity of the underlying theory or principle. In terms of the Frye test, if the 
technique is generally accepted, then the theory must be valid although not fully 
understood or explainable. Thus, proponents of voiceprints have argued that even 
though the "why" and "how" of the technique are not fully understood, the 
technique works and that alone is sufficient validation. 105 Similarly, one com-
mentator has argued: "[T]here does not appear to be general acceptance of a 
theory to explain all the phenomenon of aspirin. But even though aspirin's 
theoretical underpinnings may never be elucidated to the satisfaction of the scien-
tific community, the fact is that it works. So does the polygraph." 106 
101. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 365, 370 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. 
Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479,481 (1963) (court slfited that "[j]udicial acceptance of 
a scientific rheory or i!lstrw!lell/ can occur only when it follows a general acceptance by the commun-
ity of scientists involved") (emphasis added). 
102. See National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 42. 
I 03. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
I 04. The principal proponents of voiceprint identifications have conceded this point: "Since the 
parameters responsible for variabilities are not well determined and quantified, at the present time the 
only way to prove scientifically that interspeaker variability is greater than intraspeaker variability is 
by inference." Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiement on Voice Identification, 
51 J. Acoust. Soc'y Am. 2030, 2031 (1972). 
One commentator has described empirical validation as it relates to various drug testing proce-
dures: 
The most common tests which are used to identify narcotics are color tests, precipitate 
tests and crystal tests .... Each of these tests was empirically developed. There is no 
theory whatsoever as to why these particular colors emerge, or why particularly shaped 
crystals are formed. The foundation of the expert opinion is simply that in each instance 
in which a known narcotic was tested, these results occurred and that to the best of the 
chemist's knowledge no other substances will yield the same results. The logic of these 
tests is inferential. The specificity of the test is assumed on the basis of accumulated 
consistent data, not upon a general theory. Peculiar to this kind of logic is that it can be 
completely destroyed by one experiement which contradicts the accumulated data. 
Shellow, The Expert Witness in Narcotic Cases, in ABA, Effective Criminal Trial Technigues 173, 
177 (B. George ed. 1978). 
105. See Boren, Voiceprint-Staging A Comeback, 3 U. San. Fern. V. L. Rev. I, 9 (1974). See 
also note I 04 supra. 
106. Tarlow, supra note 59, at 922. 
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Empirical validation should be recognized as an acceptable method of estab-
lishing the reliability of a new technique. 107 Many techniques such as finger-
prints and firearms identification have -gained admissibility in this way. This 
method of validation, however, gives rise tci new questions. First, how much 
empirical research is sufficient? 108 Many courts believed that the two-year 
study on voiceprints conducted at Michigan State University provided sufficient 
validation of that technique; 10 ~ however, the National Academy of Sciences re-
port on voiceprint identification casts doubt on this conclusion.]] 0 Similarly, 
some courts have argued that the experience of polygraph examiners is sufficient 
validation for the polygraph technique, 111 while others have demonstrated serious 
deficiencies in this approach.U 2 Second, how much extrapolation to untested 
situations should be permitted? 113 For example, assuming sufficient empirical 
validation of voiceprint evidence has been achieved using undisguised male 
voices, is the technique valid when applied to female voices or to disguised 
voices? 114 Third, should validation studies be conducted by those who developed 
the theory? There may be a conflict of interest when the supporting research is 
conducted by someone with a professional o·r commercial interest in the 
technique. 115 
107. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 95 ("It would be rational to rely upon a 
scientific device to determine deception if experiments proved that it worked, even though there was 
dispute about why it worked .. "). 
108. Dr. Sopher has commented on this problem as it relates to bitemark comparisons: 
The problem of specificity in the bite mark analysis results from the lack of a scientific 
core of basic data for comparison. The results of the bite mark comparison may indicate 
a perfect or reasonably perfect fit between the bite mark and a suspect's dentition; how-
ever, how can one be absolutely or even perhaps reasonably certain that no other indi-
vidual could have produced a particular bite? Classified bite mark characteristics on 
large segments of the population are unavailable; therefore, an absolute scientific estima-
tion of specificity regarding the particular bite mark/suspect comparison is not possible. 
The situation is comparable to the point in the distant past when the I DOth set of finger-
prints was classified. At that time, it was known that the set of prints did not match the 
ninety-nine others previously recorded, but it was not known if the set of prints were 
specific for only the one individual fingerprinted. Today, after categorizing 84 million 
sets of fingerprints in the United States, it can be stated with certainty that no two sets 
match. The present position of bite mark specificity is comparable to the I DOth finger-
print case example. 
l. Sopher, Forensic Dentistry 140 ( 1976). 
109. E.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 
(1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Hodo 
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 
Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). 
II 0. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 2. 
Il I. See State v. Hancock, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 458 (C.P. 1974). 
112. Orne, See Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, in Legal 
Admissibility of the Polygraph 94, 98-106 (N. Ansley ed. 1975); Validity Panel, id. at 153-57 
(statement of Gordon Barland). See also Commonwealth v. Foley, 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 999, 
389 N .E.2d 762, 765 ( 1979) (expert should not be permitted to testify about statistical reliability of 
polygraph). 
113. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 43. 
114. See State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W .2d 432 ( 1971) (court upheld 
the use of voiceprint identification of a female as corroborative evidence). ln People v. Law, 40 Cal. 
App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974), the court excluded voiceprint evidence concerning a dis-
guised voice. 
ll?. Several cases have questioned the impartiality of experts who have become associated with 
the validity of voiceprints. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 
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Instead of directly addressing the issue of whether FlJ'e requires general 
acceptance of the theory or of both the theory and the technique, and then .focus-
ing on the problems associated with empirical validation, the courts have con-
fused the issue by concentrating on the qualifications of experts. 
The polygraph cases provide an illustration. Although F1ye cited the disci-
plines of "psychology" and "physiology" as the relevant fields in which the 
polygraph must gain acceptance, 116 several recent decisions have looked to the 
views of polygraph e:({aminers to determine whether the polygraph has been gen-
erally accepted. 117 This approach implicitly turns on the validation of the 
technique, rather than the theory. Its significance should not be underestimated 
because general acceptance of the polygraph is almost assured if the opinions of 
examiners are considered. 118 This approach, however, is not universal! y en-
dorsed. For example, in United States v .. Alexander, 11 !1 the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit required the experts to be qualified on the theory of the poly-
graph: ''Experts in neurology, psychiatry and physiology may offer needed en-
lightenment upon the basic premises of polygraphy. Polygraphists often lack ex-
tensive training in these specialized sciences." 120 Similarly, the courts have 
disagreed about the relevance of the widespread use of the polygraph in law 
enforcement as well as in security and industiial activities. Some cite this use as 
evidence of general acceptance, 121 while others ignore it. 122 
Even if empirical validation is recognized, a technician's testimony should 
never suffice to establish the validity of a novel technique: "[T]he technician 
merely follows prescribed routines, and is not expected to understand their un-
(1976): People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); United States v. Wright, 17 
U .S.C.M.A. 183, 192 n.l, 37 C.M.R. 447, 456 n.l ( 1967) (dissenting opinion). See text accom-
panying notes 129-35 infra. 
116. 293 F. at 1014. 
117. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per 
curiam, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). 
118. A related issue concerns whether the so-called "forensic sciences" or "criminalistics" could 
be considered a discrete field for purposes of the Frye test. One commentator has argued that foren-
sic science is "as much a discipline in its own right as is medicine, which also is not chemistry. not 
biology, not physics, but a fusion of all three, modified and adapted to a specific purpose, the 
treatment of disease in human beings." Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 Buffalo 
L. Rev. 393, 394 (1964 ). This issue has practical significance because once the "forensic sciences" are 
accepted, it is a short step to recognizing a subspecialty such as polygraphy as an appropriate field. 
119. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). 
120. ld. at 164 n.6. See also People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511,516,255 N.E.2d 696,699,307 
N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (1969). 
121. E.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); People v. Cutter, 12 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2133. 
2134 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). See also Tarlow, supra note 59, at 943-45 (equating general acceptance 
with "general use"). 
The widespread use of a scientific technique as evidence of its ge·nera1 acceptance has not been 
limited to the polygraph. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,441 (6th Cir. 1970) ("There was 
testimony concerning neutron activiation analysis' value in many varied applications in civil and 
commercial affairs."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857, 
860 (D.C. Cir.) (citing "general use in scientific research and industrial analysis" of spectrographic 
analysis), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946). 
122. E.g .. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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derlying fundamentals. He knows how, but not why." 123 Because it is critical 
to know the "why,'' or, as in the case of empirical validation, the implications 
of not knowing the "why," the views of scientists are essentiaJ.l 24 Moreover, 
a technician would not be qualified to testify about the general acceptability of a 
technique because presumably only a scientist would be sufficiently conversant 
with the views held by those in the relevant field. 125 
3. Establishing General Acceptance. Even if a court has pinpointed the 
community in which to look for acceptance and has decided what it is that this 
community must ·accept, the court still must decide what types of proof can be 
used to establish acceptance by the identified community. Three methods of 
proof have been recognized by the courts: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and 
legal writings, and (3) judicial opinions. 126 All three methods present problems. 
a. Expert Testimony. The issue of the qualifications of experts who testify 
about the general acceptance of a scientific technique has divided the courts. 127 
In most cases the offering party calls an expert who testifies about the validity of 
the technique as well as its general acceptance in the scientific community. 128 
Some courts, however, do not consider the testimony of one expert-,even if 
qualified "and presumably conversant with the views of other scientists-
sufficient. For example, in rejecting voiceprint evidence in People v. Kelly, 129 
the California Supreme Court questioned "whether the testimony of a single 
witness alone is ever sufficient to represent, or attest to, the views of an entire 
scientific community regarding the reliability of a new technique," 130 and 
whether the expert,. as a leading proponent of the technique, 131 could "fairly and 
impartially ... assess the position of the scientific community." 132 Sub-
sequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected Voiceprints because the 
"testimony of one expert ... cannot satisfy [the Frye] standard." 133 In effect, 
the court imposed a corroboration rule; apparently, at least two experts must 
123. Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 393, 394 ( 1964). See 
also Fong, Crimimilistics and the Prosecutor, in The Prosecutor's Desk book 547 (P. Healy & J. 
Manak eds. 1971). 
124. See Strong, supra note 19, at 16. 
125. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 154 
(I 976). 
126. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204,327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975); People v. 
Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 873, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
127. See text accompanying notes I I 6-20 supra. The requisite qualifications to testify on the 
general acceptance issue should be distinguished from the qualifications required for other purposes. 
See notes 25-26 supra. 
128. E.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (I 973); Common-
wealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). 
129. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). 
130. ld. at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152. 
131. ld. at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153 (The expert "has virtually built his career 
on the reliability of the technique."). 
132. ld. The court also characterized the qualifications of the expert as those of a technician 
rather than a scientist. ld. at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154. 
133. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977). See also Com-
monwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 207, 327 N.E.2d 671, 679-80 (1975) (dissenting opinion). But 
see United States v. Brown, 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2203, 2204 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd on 
other grounds, 384 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1978). 
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testify on the general acceptance issue. Voiceprint evidence was also rejected by 
the Michigan Supreme Court because the "reputations and careers" .1 3 -J of the 
experts favoring admissibility were "built on their voiceprint work," and there-
fore they were not "disinterested and impartial." 135 
The F1ye decision mandates neither the corroboration nor the impartiality 
requirement. Nevertheless, these requirements may mitigate, at least to some 
extent, a recurring problem in the application of the F1ye test-the inadequacy of 
the expert testimony on the general acceptance issue. For example, in People v. 
Chapter 136 the court questioned the accuracy of the expert testimony given in 
Hodo v. Superior Court 137 that voiceprints had been generally accepted, and 
noted that in "approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five cases in which 
such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert tes-
timony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability by the scientific 
community." 138 Moreover, although the Hodo court found the general accept-
ance requirement satisfied at a preliminary examination, it later excluded the 
voiceprint evidence after bearing the testimony of opposing experts at triai. 13 H 
Although corroboration by a second, impartial witness bolsters the tes-
timony presented, these requirements are themselves difficult to apply. Courts 
have not attempted to reconcile these requirements with the other merhods of 
establishing general acceptance. For instance, no court has discussed whether 
judicial notice of articles by impartial authorities can be used to corroborate the 
testimony of a "biased" expert. Moreover, the corroboration requirement may 
not advance the rationale underlying Frye. In a case in which one Well qualified 
expert testifies, this requirement would operate to exclude the evidence; in 
another case, the testimony of two less qualified experts would warrant admis-
sion. It should also be pointed out that although two experts have testified in 
favor of voiceprint analysis in a number of cases, HO the reliability and general 
acceptance of that technique remain controversial issues .141 
134. People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 146, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (1977). 
135. ld. at 145 (citing People v. Barbara. 400 Mich. 352, 358, 406, 255 N.W.2d 171, 172, 
194-95 ( 1977)). See also United States v. Wright, I 7 C. M.A. 183, 192 n. I, 37 C. ivi.R. 447, 456 
n.l ( 1967) (dissenting opinion). 
136. 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973). 
137. 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973). 
138. 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2479. 
139. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 35, 549 P.2d 1240, 1247, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 
( 1976). Other cases also have raised concerns about the tenor of testimony concerning general accep-
tance. See People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 80-81, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715-16 (1974) (court 
found expert's testimony on general acceptance "equivocal"); D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 
564-65, 385 A.2d 278, 284 (Ch. Div. 1978) (expert's testimony concerning the number of states that 
accept voiceprints "not entirely accurate and may be nothing more than the normal puffery by the 
proponent of any new device or instrument"). 
140. E.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, lOG Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973) (voiceprints 
admitted); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975) (voiceprints admitted). 
I 4 I. This is not to say that the concern underlying the corroboration requirement is not legitimate. 
The Frye objective, however, may be better achieved by requiring the trial court to exercise its 
power to call independent experts than by mechanically applying a corroboration rule. See generally 
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (court called independent polygraph 
expert); State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 549-50, 296 A.2d 644, 647 (1972) (trial court called inde-
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b. Scientific and Legal Literature. In determining whether a novel technique 
has satisifed the general acceptance standard, courts have frequently cited legal 
and scientific publications. 142 This represents a type of judicial notice. 143 
Courts using published studies are not judicially noticing the validity of the 
technique; 144 rather, they are taking judicial notice of sundry articles, texts, 
and other publications, both legal and scientific, in attempting to determine 
whether general acceptance has been achieved. 145 In some cases general 
acceptance has been established solely by this means. For example, in 
People v. Palmer, 146 the court considered the admissibility of gunshot residue 
evidence based upon scanning electron microscopic analysis. Rejecting the de-
fendant's argument that no expert testimony on the general acceptance issue had 
been proffered at trial, the court stated that "[n]o useful purpose would have 
been served by requiring expert testimony on that point'' because the literature 
on the subject demonstrated general acceptance. 147 
The use of judicial notice under these circumstances is problematical. The 
appellate court may not have discovered all the relevant articles, many of which 
may be published in technical and scientific, rather than legal, journals. Recent 
research, not yet generally available, may have raised new doubts about the 
validity of a technique. Moreover, since the defendant in Palmer presumably did 
not have the burden of production or persuasion on the general acceptance is-
sue, 148 he had no obligation to produce his own experts, ~nd since the govern-
pendent voiceprint experts); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. I 9 I, 213, 327 N.E.2d 67 I, 683 
(I 975) (dissenting opinion) (trial court should have called independent voiceprint experts); Fed. R. 
Evid. 706. 
142. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 
(1971); People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1978); People v. 
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 35-36, 549 P.2d 1240, 1247-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151-52 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 199 n.3, 204,327 N.E.2d 671, 676 n.3, 678 (1975); People v. 
Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 705, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("documents, treatises, 
studies and articles" introduced as exhibits); People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 873. 385 N.Y.S.2d 
228, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Commonwealth v. Tapa, 471 Pa. 223, 229-33, 369 A.2d 1277, 1280-82 
(1977). 
Two cases have cited informal polls of scientists as being relevant to the general acceptance 
issue. D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 560-61, 385 A.2d 278, 282 (Ch. Div. 1978); People v. 
Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704,711,405 N.Y.S.2d 365,370 (Sup. Ct. 1978). See also State v. Cary, 99 
N.J. Super. 323, 331, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970) 
(citing 39 letters from scientists). 
143. See generally I J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, ~ 200[05]. 
144. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. 
145. In State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 
264 A.2d 209 (1970), the court cited 39 letters from scientists when considering the general accep-
tance issue. The court stated: "They have relevancy in indicating that there is an existing controversy 
in the related scientific fields concerned as to the lack of scientific acceptance of the reliability of the 
technique." !d. at 33 I, 239 A.2d at 684. 
146. 80 CaL App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (I 978). 
147. !d. at 254, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 473. 
148. Such fundamental issues as the burden and standard of proof with respect to general accep-
tance are rarely discussed in the reported cases. A few cases indicate that the burden of proof rests 
with the offering party. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 40, 549 P.2d 1240, 1251, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 144, 255 ( 1976) (Prosecution "failed to carry [its] burden of establishing ... reliabil-
ity .... "); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 148, 257 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1977) (Prosecution 
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ment' s expert did not address the general acceptance issue, the defendant had no 
reason to cross-examine the expert on this point. 149 If the appellate court cited 
the articles without notice to the defense, the defendant may never have had an 
opportunity to contest the issue-to call his own experts or to cite articles ex-
pressing opposing views in his appellate brief. 150 
On the other hand, use of judicial notice to determine lack of general accept-
ance seems more acceptable. If one or two experts testify that a particular 
technique has been generally accepted, but the literature demonstrates a signifi-
cant dispute on the matter, it would be appropriate for a court, either trial or 
appellate, to consider the available literature in holding that general acceptance 
has not been achieved. Because the proponent has the burden of proof on the 
general acceptance issue, the proponent should be responsible for informing the 
trial court of opposing views in the literature and for explaining why the litera-
ture is not persuasive evidence of lack of general acceptance. Failure to inform 
the trial court of opposing scientific views should not preclude a court from 
judicially noticing those views. 
c. Judicial Opinions. Some courts have considered prior judicial decisions 
in deciding whether general acceptance has been achieved. 151 Judicially notic-
ing the testimony of experts that appears in other cases seems appropriate; 152 it 
should not matter whether the experts present their opinions in scientific journals 
or in c·ourtroom testimony. Some cases, however, go beyond this practice; they 
''seem to adopt an approach to the Frye test that emphasizes previous court 
decisions, considering general acceptance not only by scientists but also by 
courts." 153 State v. Olderman 15 -J illustrates this development. Based solely on 
cases upholding admissibility, the court in Olderman concluded that voiceprint 
evidence had met the F'J'e test. This use of prior judicial decisions undercuts the 
rationale supporting Frye- that those most qualified to judge the validity of a 
"failed to demonstrate that voiceprint evidence has achieved general scientific acceptance . . . "). 
See also People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352,365, 255 N.W.2d 171, 175 (1977) ("Frye emphasize[s] 
that it is the burden of the party seeking admissibility to demonstrate acceptability of the proposed 
technique [polygraph]."). Judicial commentary on the standard of proof, however. is virtually 
nonexistent. 
149. An expert did testify, but not on this. issue. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 254 n.8. J.JS C1l. Rptr. at 
473 n.S. 
150. See generally I J. \Veinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, 11 201[05]; Davis. Judicial Norice. 
1969 Law & Soc. Ord. 513. 
151. People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239,252, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466.472 (1978). Accord, 
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975); People v. Rogers, 86 
Misc. 2d 868, 873, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
152. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 34, 549 P.2d !240, 1247, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 
(1976) (citing expert's testimony in Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, !06 Cal. Rptr. 
547 (1973)); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 199-200 n.3, 327 N.E.2d 671, 676 n.3 
(1975) (citing expert's testimony in United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); 
Commonwealth v. Tapa, 471 Pa. 223, 230 n.2, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 n.2 (1977) (citing expert's 
testimony in Worley v. State, 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. App. 1972)). 
153. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 45. 
154. 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N .E.2d 442 (!975). See also Reed v. State, 35 l'vld. App. 472, 
433, 372 A.2d 243,-251 (1977), rev'd, 283 Md.· 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Rogers, 86 
Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1976) 
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technique should have the determinative voice. 155 Even if reliance on prior 
judicial decisions is a proper application of the Frye test, Olderman remains 
troublesome. Although the court recognized that other decisions had rejected 
voiceprint evidence, 156 it failed to explain why these cases did not show, at 
least, a judicial dispute on the subject. Moreover, several of the cases cited by 
the court as upholding voiceprint evidence did not apply the Frye standard 157 
and one case that did apply the Frye test was subsequently overruled. 158 
4. When to Apply Frye. Courts that accept the Frye test often have difficulty 
deciding when to apply it. As McCormick has commented, the application of the 
Frye test is "highiy selective." 159 indeed, the selective application of the gen-
eral acceptance standard is one of its most notable features-inconsistencies in 
application abound. Part of tbe problem may lie in <:lefining what types of evi-
dence should be classified as "scientific evidence" and thus subject to the Frye 
test. 160 This definitional problem, however, does not wholly explain the selec-
tive application phenomenon. 161 For example, the Missouri Supreme Court in 
State v. Stout 162 held that the results of a blood examination by neutron activa-
tion analysis should have been excluded because the technique had not gained 
general acceptance in the scientific community. 163 Several years earlier, how-
ever, the same court had upheld the admissibility of the results of a "paraffin 
test" without referring to Frye; all that was required, according to the court in 
State v. Fields, 164 was that the examiner be qualified, the test be conducted 
155. See text accompanying note 64 supra. The use of judicial precedents in applying the general 
acceptance test was criticized in an early article as illustrating the doctrine of legal relevancy. Traut-
man, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 385, 395, 413 (1952). 
See also Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677, 682 (1967). 
156. 44 Ohio App. 2d at 138 n.7, 336 N.E)d at 448 n.7. 
!57. Although cited by the court, the following decisions did not apply the general acceptance 
standard: Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 
App. 1972); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
!58. Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973), was subsequently 
overruled by the California Supreme Court in People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 35, 549 P.2d 1240, 
1247, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 (1976). 
159. C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 490. See also I D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 59, 
at 818; Boyce, supra note 59, at 314. 
!60. Professors Wright and Graham have commented on this problem: "What is 'scientific evi-
dence' to which the test applies? When a witness testifies that he saw the defendant throw a rock at 
the victim, the inferences to be drawn from this testimony involve a number of principles of physics, 
but few courts would apply the Frye test." 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 87 n.lO. 
Various definitions have been offered. See G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence 400 
(1978) ("The adjective 'scientific,' as we broadly use it here, refers to evidence that draws its 
convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics, or the like."); Boyce, supra note 59, 
at 314 n.19 ("Scientific evidence as used in this article refers to those areas of evidentiary inquiry 
which purport to be based upon the scientific method .... "). See also C. McCormick, supra note 
23, at 488-89. 
161. For one explanation of why courts may apply Frye selectively, see Strong, supra note 19, at 
11. 
162. 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972). 
163. !d. at 371. 
164. 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968). 
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according to usual standards, the test and results be adequately described, and 
the opponent be given an opportunity to cross-examine the expert. 165 
A series of cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
offers another illustration. In United States v. Stifel, 166 the Sixth Circuit applied 
the Fl)'e test and upheld the admissibility of evidence based upon neutron activa-
tion analysis. 167 Five years later, in United States v. Franks, 168 the same court 
upheld the admissibility of voiceprint evidence, stating in a footnote that general 
acceptance was "nearly synonymous with reliability." 16 ~ Equating general ac-
,.ceptance with reliability, however, represents an abandonment of Frye because 
the reliabilitY of a scientific technique could be established notwithstanding its 
lack of genera! acceptance in the scientific community. 170 A subsequent voice-
print case, United States v. Jenkins, 171 in which Frye was not mentioned, pro-
vided further evidence that the Sixth Circuit was moving away from F1ye. 172 
Despite the unmistakable thrust of these cases, 173 the Sixth Circuit inexplicably 
resurrected Frye in Ui1ited State~ v. Brown 174 and held that evidence based upon 
ion microprobic analysis was inadmissible. 175 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also has applied the Frye 
standard selectively. In 1963 that court adopted the Fry>e test in Commonwealth 
v. Fatalo, 176 rejecting the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Nevertheless, in 
Commonwealth v. Devlin 177 the court chose not to apply the Frye test and up-
held the admissibility of identification of skeletal remains by x-ray compari-
son.178 Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 179 the court held that 
165. ld. at 516. 
166. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971 ). 
167. ld. at 438. 
168. 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
169. !d. at 33 n.l2. See also United States v. Brown, 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)2203, 2204 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 384 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1978). Other courts have recognized 
that general acceptance and reliability are distinct tests. In D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 
385 A.2d 278 (Ch. Div. 1978), the court concluded that admissibility was permissible if either test is 
satisfied. ld. at 559, 385 A.2d at 281. In contrast, the court in People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 
405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978), indicated that both tests must be satisfied. ld. at 706, 405 
N.Y.S.2d at 367. 
170. Citing Franks, one court has observed that "[i]n essence, the Sixth Circuit has modified 
Frye." People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 879, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
171. 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975). 
172. Citing Franks, the court stated: "This Court has recently held that voiceprint analysis falls 
into the category of scientific evidence and that its admissibility is a matter within a trial judge's 
discretion." Id. at 827. The court also noted that Franks had been satisfied because the trial court 
had made "an extensive inquiry into [the expert's] qualifications and the reliability of the scientific 
process." ld. · 
173. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 396, 391 A.2d 364, 375 (1978) ("It is important to noie, 
however, that neither United States v. Baller ... nor United States v. Franks ... seemed to apply 
the Frye test."); 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 616 (1975). 
174. 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977). 
175. !d. at 556-57. In a subsequent case, United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979), the Sixth Circuit applied the general acceptance test to expert tes-
timony concerning the microscopic comparison of hair samples. 
176. 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 480-81 (1963). 
177. 365 Mass. 149, 310 N.E.2d 353 (1974). 
178. The Court did, however, attempt to distinguish Frye. ld. at 154-55, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
179. 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974). 
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polygraph evidence could be admitted under certain circumstances even though 
the court acknowledged that general acceptance had not yet been achieved. 180 
Then, in Commonwealth v. Lykus, 181 the court again cited Frye as the control-
ling standard in admitting voiceprint evidence: 182 In a footnote the court men-
tioned that the state had argued (correctly it would appear) that Devlin had mod-
ified Frye .183 The court responded: "We make no comment at this time as to 
whether the Devlin ... case has application in any circumstances other than the 
precise scientific principles involved in [that case]." 184 Thus, while adhering to 
the Frye standard in Lykus, the court acknowledged its selective application; 
nevertheless it failed to explain the bases for such selectivity .185 
If the Frye test is justified because it assures that "those most qualified to 
assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative 
voice," 186 it makes no sense to rely upon the "voice" of the scientific com-
munity in considering the admissibility of some techniques but not others. In-
stead of using Frye as an analytical tool to decide whether novel scientific evi-
dence should be admitted, it appears that many courts apply it as a label to 
justify their own views about the reliability of particular forensic techniques. 
180. ld. at 425, 313 N.E.2d at 123. The Michigan Supreme Court described A Juvenile as fol-
lows: ''This case is peculiar in that it purports to follow the Frye rule but nonetheless makes a 
special exception to permit the defendant to submit to polygraph testing and offer the tests in evi-
dence .... " People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 388-89, 255 N.W.2d 171, !86 (1977). 
181. 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). 
182. Id. at 196, 327 N.E.2d at 674. 
183. ld. at 203 n.5, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.5. 
184. ld. 
185. Another example of selective application is found in the decisions of the U.S. Court of 
Military Appeals. That court, in a 1954 decision, cited Frye as the controlling authority in determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence involving the detection of narcotics through urinalysis. United States 
v. Ford, 4 C.M.A. 611, 613, 16 C.M.R. 185, 187 (1954). Subsequently, in United States v. Wright, 
17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967), the court became the first appellate tribunal to uphold the 
admissibility of voiceprint evidence. The majority opinion did not mention Frye and was vigorously 
criticized in the dissenting opinion for abandoning the general acceptance test. !d. at 193, 37 C.M.R. 
at 457. Since the major research on voiceprint identification had not commenced in 1967, the 
technique clearly was not generally accepted by the scientific community at the time Wright was 
decided. Recently, however, in United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275 (C.M.A. 1977), the court cited 
Frye as the controlling standard in considering the admissibility of expert testimony on the psychol-
ogy of eyewitness identifications. The court stated: "In United States v. Ford ... we adopted the 
test set forth in Frye v. United States ... for the admissibility of expert testimony." Id. at 276. 
Inexplicably, the court cited Wright along with Frye, apparently believing that the two cases embrace 
the same standard. 
An interesting example of selective application of Frye is found in the polygraph stipulation cases. 
In recent years a growing number of courts have admitted the results of polygraph examinations, but 
only if the parties stipulate in advance to the admissibility of the results. See J. Reid &. F. Inbau, 
supra note 8, at 325-35; Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). Instead of requiring the polygraph 
technique to meet the stringent standards imposed by Frye, these courts consider it sufficient that the 
technique ''has been developed to a state in which its results are probative enough to warrant admis-
sibility upon stipulation." State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962); accord, 
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 73 I, 736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976). In 
effect, lack of general acceptance is somehow offset by a stipulation between the parties. However, 
because the stipulation "does nothing to enhance the reliability of such evidence ... , " Romero v. 
State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), the Frye test is effectively bypassed in this 
context. 
186. See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
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5. Scope of Appellate RevielV. The scope of appellate review of a trial 
court's app1ication of the Frye test is another issue that has received minimal 
analysis IBi but has generated much confusion. Some courts apparently treat the 
general acceptance issue as a matter of law, subject to de novo review on ap-
peal.188 Other courts, however, take the view that the "determination of 'gen-
eral acceptance' is primarily a question of fact for the trial court subject to an 
appellate court's determination that the trial court has not abused its discre-
tion." 1B8 , 
The abuse of discretion standard has been properly criticized as contributing 
to the "essential vagueness" of the Frye test. 190 The full implication of this 
criticism can be understood in the light of Coppolino v. State. 181 After citing 
F1ye, the court in Coppolino upheld the admissibility of a scientific technique 
that could not have satisfied the F1ye. standard, stating, "the trial judge enjoys 
wide discretion in areas concerning the admission of evidence." 182 Since Cop-
polino is most often viewed as rejecting the Fl)'e general acceptance standard in 
favor of the relevancy approach, 183 the abuse of discretion standard would seem 
to blur the distinction between Frye and the principal alternative approach to the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 194 
187. See People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 74-75, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 711 (1974). 
188. ld. at 75, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 7 11 ( "[T]here is a view that the [general acceptance] issue is one 
of law .... "). The D.C. Circuit follows this view. ln United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 
(D.D.C. 1972), the district court, ruling on the admissibility of polygraph evidence, concluded that 
the Frye test had "been satisified." !d. at 692. The D.C. Circuit reversed per curiam without issuing 
an opinion. United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also United States v. 
Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("neither the court's opinion nor the record satisfy the 
Frye standard of admissibility" as applied to voiceprint evidence). 
189. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 109, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1975); accord, Hodo 
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 784-85, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 550 (1973); People v. King, 
266 Cal. App. 2d 437,443,72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (1968). See also Tarlow, supra note 59, at 942. 
Other courts seem to equivocate. For example, in United Stutes v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (I 971 ), a case upholding the admissibility of neutron activation 
under the Frye test, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit emphasized the "considerable area of 
discretion" enjoyed by the trial court "in admitting or refusing to admit proffered expert testimony." 
ld. at 437-38. The same court, however, minimized the extent of trial court discretion in United 
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), when it overruled a lower court's determination that 
ion microprobic analysis had satisfied the general acceptance test. The court simply concluded: "Af-
ter extensive review of the record, we are inclined to agree with Appellant that the Government 
failed to fulfill the threshold requirement of demonstrating that ion microprobic analysis is a generally 
accepted procedure .... " !d. at 557. 
190. I D. Louise]] & C. Mueller. supra note 59, at 821. Such a standard would also undercut 
several of the purported rationales for the Frye test, such as the promotion of uniformity and the 
conservation of judicial time. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. 
191. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), 
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). For a more detailed discussion of Coppolino, see text accompany-
ing notes 285-87 infra. 
192. ld. at 70. 
193. See I D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 825; C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 
490 n.33; A. fv!oenssens & F. Inbau, supra note 7, at 4-5; Strong, supra nule 19, al 16. See also lexi 
accompanying notes 276-87 infra. 
194. This blurring has already occurred. Professors Louise!] and Mueller cite United States v. 
Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975), as a case applying Frye but 
emphasizing judicial discretion. i D. Louiseii & C. Mueller, supra note SLJ, at ~21. Baller, however, 
does not apply Frye. Baller, in turn, cites Coppolino and United States v. Stifel. 433 F.2d 431 (6th 
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Moreover, the courts have not explained why recognition of trial judge dis-
cretion is appropriate in this context. While it has long been recognized that a 
trial judge has discretion with respect to an expert's qualifications, 1 Hs the "ques-
tion of qualifying the expert" should not subsume the "question of qualifying 
the process." 196 Deferring to a trial court in one instance does not justify 
deferring in the other. As one court has observed correctly: "The answer to the 
question about the reliability of a scientific technique or process does not vary 
according to the circumstances of each case. It is therefore inappropriate to view 
this threshold q1.1estion of reliability as a matter within each trial judge's indi-
vidual discretion.'' 1 97 
B. Problematic Results 
The problems associated with the application of Frye discussed in the previ-
ous section have led commentators to label the general acceptance standard "re-
markably vague," 198 "undefinable," 199 and "not enlightening." 200 There 
are, however, other criticisms and problems. For example, the general accept-
ance standard has been criticized for excluding reliable evidence. Paradoxically, 
the standard also may permit the admission of unreliable evidence. 
1. Exclusions. As one commentary has pointed out, "[a] literal reading of 
Frye v. United States would require that the courts always await the passing of a 
'cultural lag' during which period the new method will have had sufficient time 
to diffuse through scientific discipline and create a requisite body of scientific 
opinion needed for acceptability." 201 This delay, according to critics, deprives 
the courts of reliable evidence. 202 
Of course, courts applying Frye take a different view. The D. C. Circuit 
has recognized that the Frye standard retards the admissibility of novel forensic 
techniques but has stated that such a consequence is not an "unwarranted 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). Stifel applies Frye (and also emphasizes trial court 
discretion); Coppolino, as noted in the text, is often cited as rejecting Frye. 
195. See C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 29-30. 
196. Case Comment, Evidence: Admissibility of Spectrographic Voice Identification, 56 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1235, 1246 (1972). 
197. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978). Moreover, the recognitition of 
trial court discretion in this matter would seem to be inconsistent with the use of judicial notice on 
appeal. See text accompanying notes 142-50 supra. If the trial court has not abused its discretion, can 
an appellate court judicially notice articles challenging the reliability of a technique and thereby find 
a lack of general acceptance? 
198. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 87; see also 1 D. Louise]] & C. Mueller, 
supra note 59, at 821. 
199. Strong, supra note 19, at 14. 
200. C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 490. 
201. Maletskos & Spielman, supra note 80, at 958. 
202. One judge phrases this criticism rather compellingly: "Society need not tolerate homicide 
until there develops a body of medical literature about some particular lethal agent." Coppolino v. 
State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (concurring opinion), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 
120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). See also United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 
53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Frye "precludes too much relevant evidence for purposes of the fact determin-
ing process .... "); l.D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 822; Boyce, supra note 59, at 
314. 
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cost.'' 203 Indeed, some courts consider the conservative nature of the Frye test 
its primary advantage. 204 These courts raise a valid point. The question is not 
whether Frye embodies a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific 
evidence (which it does) but rather whether such conservatism is justified. Thus, 
the critical issue is whether other approaches can better achieve the Frye objec-
tive of ''prevent[ing] . . . the introduction into evidence of specious and un-
founded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such principles." 205 If 
such alternative approaches exist, then the conservatism implicit in the F1ye test 
is not an "advantage," but rather an unjustified obstacle to the truth-determining 
process. Alternatives to Frye are discussed in later sections of this Article. 206 
2. Inclusions. The critics who argue that the Frye standard is too conserva-
tive are saying, in effect, that the general acceptance standard works too well-
it excludes much that is reliable along· with that which is unreliable. Interest-
ingly, many commentators have overlooked instances in which Frye does not 
work. This defect can be illustrated by the so-called "paraffin test," which was 
designed to detect gunshot residue on the hand of a person who has recently 
fired a weapon. 207 Introduced in this country in the early 1930's, 208 the paraf-
fin test was adopted quickly by law enforcement agencies. 209 The first reported 
case upholding the admissibility of this test was decided in 1936. 210 Although a 
series of articles questioned the validity of the paraffin test, 211 it was not until 
1959 that a case rejecting the test was reported, 212 and it was not until 1967 that 
203. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
204. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,.31, 549 P.2d 1240, !245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976). 
See also Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385-86, 391 A.2d 364. 370 (1978). 
205. Strong, supra note 19, at 14. 
206. See text accompanying notes 265-388 infra. 
207. For a more complete description of the paraffin test, see text accompanying notes 228-31 
infra. 
208. See Mathews, The Paraffin Test, 102 American Rifleman 20 (1954). 
209. An article published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in October of 1935 commenced 
with the following phrase: "In view of the current widespread use of the diphenylamine [paraffin) 
test .... " Diphenylamine Test for Gun Powder, 4 FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 5 (1935). See also 
Castellanos & Plasencia, The Paraffin Gauntlet: A New Technique for the Derma-Nitrate Test, 32 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 465 (1941). See also authorities cited in note 214 infra. 
210. Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 {1936). 
211. In 1935 the FBI Laboratory, on the basis of a number of experiments, concluded that "[i)n 
spite of the obvious impossibility of drawing positive conclusions frpm the diphenylamine [paraffin] 
test, when properly conducted and with a full understanding of its merits and limitations, it is ·of 
some value in criminal investigations." Diphenylamine Test for Gun Powder, supra note 209, at 6. 
In 1940 the FBI reported the results of further experiments "which corroborate[ d) the unreliability of 
the diphenylamine [paraffin] test as a test for gunpowder residue." Further Observations on the 
Diphenylamine Test for Gun Powder Residue, 9 FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 10 (1940). In a sub-
sequent article, the FBI reported that based on additional tests the "results obtained demonstrated the 
unreliability of the test." Gunpowder Tests, Ill FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 2, 3 ( 1949). But see 
Conrad, Evidential Implications of the Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder Residues, 44 Marq. L. 
Rev. 500 (1961); Mathews, supq note 208. See also Turkel & Lipman, Unreliability of Dermal 
Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. Crim. L. C. & P.S. 281 ( 1955). 
212. See Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959). Brooke was subsequently fol-
lowed in Born v. State, 397 P.2d 924 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965); 
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the first comprehensive evaluation of the test was published in the scientific 
literature. That study found the test to be unreliable. 213 Prior to this study the 
paraffin test was used widely; 214 evidence based on the test was admitted in 
trials through the 1960's. 215 In short, the paraffin test was generally accepted. 
By looking to the scientific community to assure the reliability of novel 
techniques, the Frye model assumes that extensive testing of the technique will 
be conducted by that community. The paraffin test experience casts doubt upon 
this assumption. As one commentator has noted, "[n]othing in the scientific 
method guarantees that hypotheses will be tested or when they will be 
tested .... " 216 Of course, opponents of Frye cannot take much comfort in this 
problem because if the stringent requirements imposed by Frye would not have 
prevented the admissibility of the paraffin test, it seems doubtful that a less 
demanding standard would have. Indeed, cases not applying the Frye standard 
did admit paraffin test results. 217 
Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 402 S.W.2d 863, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 942 (1966). Other courts, 
however, admitted evidence based on this test after Brooke was decided. See cases cited in note 215 
infra. 
213. See Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test", 12 J. Forensic Sci. 19 (1967). Prior 
studies that reached the same conclusion were not based on extensive testing. See note 211 supra. 
214. See A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, supra note 7, at 7 n.12 ("The test was enthusiastically 
embraced by crime laboratories generally which used it very widely in criminal investigations."); 
Cowan & Purdon, supra note 213, at 20; Conrad, supra note 211, at 504; Midkiff, Detection of 
Gunshot Residues: Modem Solutions for an Old Problem, 3 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 77, 78 (1975). 
215. See Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771, 394 S.W.2d 135 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 
(1967); State v. Foster, 44 Haw. 403, 354 P.2d 960 (1960); State v. Hoy, 199 Kan. 340, 430.P.2d 
275 (1967); People v. Simpson, 5 Mich. App. 479, 146 N.W.2d 828 (1966); State v. Fields, 434 
S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266 S.W.2d 864 (1953). 
216. Martin, supra note 17, at 1064. 
217. See Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771, 394 S.W.2d 135 (1965) cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 
(1967); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 
!88 A. 304 (1936). This is not evidence, however, that the Fl)'e test worked. The first case applying 
Frye was decided in 1959, over twenty-five years after the paraffin test was first introduced and 
widely accepted. See A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, supra note 7, at 7 n.I2. 
The voiceprint cases offer another illustration. In the initial cases applying the Frye test, voice-
print evidence was excluded. See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); 
State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 
(Law Div .. !968), remanded again, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 
209 (1970). But see United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. !83, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967) (voiceprints 
admitted; Frye test not applied). Then, Dr. Oscar Tosi Cof\lpleted his two-year study of voiceprints at 
Michigan State University. See Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Voice Identification 
Research (1972); Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification, 
51 J. Acoust. Soc'y Am. 2030 (1972). Even though the results of this study were favorable, many 
questions were left unanswered. Nevertheless, courts began to admit voiceprint evidence, finding 
general acceptance had been achieved as a result of the Tosi study. See Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 
Cal. App. 3d 778, !06 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973); United Stales v. Brown, 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 
2203 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 384 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1978); Commonwealth v. 
Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). These courts were unwilling to pay the price de-
manded by Frye-waiting for the reaction of the scientific community to the Tosi study. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191,208,327 N.E.2d 671, 680 (1975) (Kaplan, J., dissenting) 
(The "scientific community had not had sufficient time to study Dr. Tosi's work .... "). The 
National Academy of Sciences report demonstrates that general acceptance of voiceprints in the scien-
tific community remains a debatable issue. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 2. 
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C. Obscuring Issues 
Perhaps the most important flaw in the Frye test is that by focusing atten-
tion on the general acceptance issue, the test obscures critical problems in the 
use of a particular technique. Cases considering the admissibility of neutron acti-
vation analysis (NAA) illustrate this point. 218 Under the Frye test courts have 
concentrated primarily on the general acceptance of NAA. 2 H This approach 
tends to conceal the most critical aspect of NAA-whether, as interpret~d, the 
results of the test are relevant to the issues in dispute. 220 
For example, in the detection of gunshot residues, activation analysis is 
used to discover the presence and quantity of the elements antimony and barium 
on the hand of a person suspected of discharging a firearm. These elements are 
the primer constituents of most American-manufactured ammunition, and their 
presence in certain concentrations is indicative of the recent firing of a 
weapon. 221 In State v. Spencer 222 a government expert testified that NAA re-
vealed the presence of 1 .67 micrograms of barium and 1.33 micrograms of an-
timony on the defendant's hand, thus conclusively establishing, in the expert's 
opinion, that the defendant recently had fired a gun. 223 
The presence and quantity of antimony and barium, however, have no prob-
. ative value unless the detected amounts differ from normal concentrations of 
these elements in the general population. 224 The relevancy of this type of in-
formation, therefore, depends on the validity of background studies of the gen-
eral population and the proper correlation of these studies with the data derived 
from the analysis in a particular case. Similarly, if NAA is used for comparative 
purposes, such as hair analysis, the matching of certain elements, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively, in two samples becomes relevant only if the detected 
distribution differs from hair samples in the general population. 225 In short, 
NAA involves problems of statistical probability. 226 Instead of concentrating on 
whether NAA has been generally accepted, the courts should have been con-
cerned with the statistical foundation on which NAA evidence rests. If this had 
218. For a discussion of the NAA, see A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, supra note 7, at 441-46; 
Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra note 1, at 997-1080. 
219. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); 
State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971). 
220. See Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra note 1, at 998 
("[M]ost of the legal problems surrounding NAA do not involve its validity as a technique of chemi-
cal analysis. Rather, interpretation of the results of the chemical analysis-the relevance of the 
results to a particular legal issue-causes most of the difficulties."). See also 1 D. Louisell & C. 
Mueller, supra note 59, at 848-49. 
221. See Ruch, Buchanan, Guinn, Bellanca & Pinker, Neutron Activation Analysis in Scientific 
Crime Detection-Some Recent Developments, 9 J. Forensic Sci. 119, 129-31 (1964). 
222. 298 Minn. 456, 216 N.W.2d 131 (1974). 
223. !d. at 459, 216 N.W.2d at 134. 
224. Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra note I, at 1074-78. 
225. ld. at 1013-14. 
226. See Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 23, 
46-47; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 
1329, 1342 n.40 (1971 ); Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra 
note I, at 1013-14. 
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been the courts' focus, they would have better understood the misleading nature 
of testimony that two hair samples subject to NAA "were all from the same 
source, that is, the same person." 227 
The paraffin test cases offer another illustration. This test is used to detect 
the presence of nitrite and nitrate residues, which, due to the backblast of gases 
that escape through crevices in the weapon, may be deposited on thehand of a 
person firing a gun. The residues are removed by means of a paraffin cast and, 
when tested with a reagent, produce a color reaction. The problem with the test 
is its nonspecificity; a significant number of substances other than gunpowder 
residues contain nitrates and nitrites and therefore also produce a positive reac-
tion. For example, one study concluded that a positive reaction is produced by 
" 'rust,' colored fingernail polishes, residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap 
water"; 228 another study found that "[t]obacco or tobacco ash, fertilizer, phar-
maceuticals, leguminous plants, urine" 229 all produce a reaction. In considering 
the admissibility of the paraffin test, a court applying the Frye test would, of 
course, focus on the general acceptance of the test. This approach tends to mask 
several problems. First, neither the cases nor the literature disclose why the reac-
tion occurs. This suggests that the test may have been validated empirically. If 
this is so, studies testing a large number of substances must be conducted in 
order to validate the test. Even if the reaction were understood, it should have 
been clear that the test was specific for nitrates and nitrites, but not necessarily 
for gunshot residues. Again, extensive testing of other substances should have 
been conducted. These problems should have been a prime concern of the courts 
that initially considered the admissibility of the test. Second, once it was estab-
lished that many common substances produce a positive reaction, the probative 
value of the evidence would have become marginal at best and could have been 
excluded on this basis. If, however, a positive reaction to the test is accom-
panied by microscopic identification of gunpowder particles, the problem of 
nonspecificity is overcome 230 and consequently, the argument for admission be-
comes more persuasive. Finally, by the 1960's the application of neutron activa-
tion, a method far superior to the paraffin test for detecting gunshot residues, 
227. State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10, 22 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). See also 
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970) (samples "were 'of the same type and 
same manufacture'"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); People v. Collins, 43 Mich. App. 259, 
264, 204 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1972) .(hair samples "came from the same source"), app. dismissed, 
391 Mich. 798, cert. denied, 419 U.S·.·866 (1974); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 368(Mo. 1972) 
(blood analysis revealed "match of the materials"); State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 421, 260 A.2d 
547, 560 (1969) (samples had "common origin or source"), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971); State v. Krummacher, 269 Ore. 125, 132, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1974) ("same batch"); 
Ward v. State, 427 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (hair samples "were identical and 
probably came from the same person"); Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation 
Analysis, supra note I, at 1024. 
228. Cowan & Purdon, supra note 213, at 23. 
229. Turkel & Lipman, supra note 211, at 282. 
230. Two of the cases admitting paraffin test results include this type of evidence. See State v. 
Fields, 434 S. W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 
(1936). 
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was recognized. 231 The availability of such an alternative method should play a 
role in the admissibility decision, but c;oncentrating on the general acceptance 
issue does not adequately. take this factor into account. 
D. Current Status of the Frye Test_ 
The current status of the Frye test is difficult to assess. While some courts 
have rejected the general acceptance standard, 232 there remains considerable sup-
port for the Frye test. 233 However, there are, in fact, several Frye tests, not 
one. Some courts, such as the D.C. Circuit, have applied a strict interpretation 
of Frye. 234 Other courts have followed People v. Williams, 235 limiting the field 
to those experts who are familiar with the use of a particular scientific proc-
ess. 236 Williams, in tum, has been applied in different ways. 237. Still other 
courts, while citing Frye, "seem tacitly to have ignored it." 238 Moreover, the 
selective application of the test has added another element of confusion. 239 ln 
sum, Frye may be tottering, but has not yet fallen. 
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 240 has not resolved the un-
certain status of the Frye test. Indeed, the Federal Rules, which became effective 
in 1975 and have been adopted in various forms in twenty-two jurisdictions, 241 
231. See Watkins & Watkins; Identification of Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis, 15 
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 115 (1964); Midldff, supra note 214, at 79; Ruch, Guinn, Buchanan, 
Bellanca & Pinker, supra note 221, at 129-31. The first reported case admitting NAA of gunshot 
residues was People v. Pieropan, 72 Misc. 2d 770, 340 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Oneida County Ct. 1973). 
In addition, in 1959 Hanison and Gilroy proposed a method of detection that was more reliable 
than the paraffin test. See Harrison & Gilroy, Firearms Discharge Residues, 4 J. Forensic Sci. 184 
( 1959). This test apparently was not widely adopted because of its lack of sensitivity. See Pillay, 
New Method for the Collection and Analysis of Gunshot Residues as Forensic Evidence, 19 J. 
Forensic Sci. 769 (1974). See also State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976) 
(modified Hanison-Gilroy test excluded); Commonwealth v. Fanior, 446 Pa. 31, 284 A.2d 684 
( 1971) (admissibility of Harrison-Gilroy test upheld; however, court apparently believed it was deal-
ing with the paraffin test). 
232. E.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); 
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). 
233. Several state supreme courts and several federal courts of appeals have applied Frye in recent 
cases. See United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alexander, 526 
F.2d 161, 163 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 
374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977). 
234. E.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also People v. Kelly, 
17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). 
235. 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958). 
236. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra. 
237. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra. 
238. C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 490. 
239. See text accompanying notes 159-86 supra. 
240. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976)). 
241. The following jurisdictions have adopted variations of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The Military Rules of Evidence also are patterned after the Federal Rules. 
Other states, including Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont are 
considering adoption. 
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have contributed to the confusion. Although the federal courts generally followed 
the Frye standard prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, 242 the Rules are 
silent on whether the general acceptance standard has been superseded. 243 The 
issue is simply ignored in the Advisory Committee's Notes, 244 congressional 
committee reports, 245 floor debates, and hearings. 246 Some courts 247 and com-
mentators 248 assume that Frye remains the applicable standard, while others re-
ject this view. 24 ~ 
Those who argue that the Frye test survived the enactment of the Federal 
Rules have some support in the legislative history. Because the Federal Rules 
were not intended to be a comprehensive codification of the rules of evidence, 2 50 
a number of evidentiary rules are not covered, 251 and many others, though men-
tioned, are treated only in a general ·fashion. Therefore, it can be argued that 
because Frye was the established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears 
in the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remains intact. 252 
242. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975). See also United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). 
243. Rule 401, which defines relevant evidence, and Rules 702-703, which govern expert tes-
timony, are the pertinent provisions. 
244. The Aqvisory Committee's Notes are found at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). For earlier drafts, see 
51 F.R.D. 315 (1971); 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969). 
245. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Cong. 
& Ad. News 7075; S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 7051; H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 7098 (conference report). 
246. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Con g., 1st Sess. (1973); Rules of 
Evidence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1974). 
247. See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 
557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir. 1976) (tool mark identification is a "generally 
accepted procedure"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
248. See I D. Louise!! & C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 818 (Frye probably survives enactment of 
Federal Rules); P. Rothstein, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates 268 
(1978). 
249. Two cases have held that state rules of evidence, patterned after the Federal Rules, displace 
Frye. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 
(1975). See also United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1117 (1979); United Stares v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wilson, 
361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
Commentators have also endorsed this view. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 
92; Abbell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal Trials, 15 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 29, 32 (1977); Berger, Courts Wrestle with Standards for Admission of Scientific 
Advances, Nat'! L.J., Sept. 24, 1979, at 22, col. I; Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evi-
dence Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 187 (1976); Comment, 
Expert Testimony and Voice Spectrogram Analysis, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q. 775, 782 n.27. 
250. See E. Morgan, Basic Problems of State and Federal Evidence (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976); 
S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 735-44 (2d ed. 1977). 
251. For example, impeachment by evidence of bias is not mentioned in the ·Rules. 
252. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 250, at 426 ("It would be odd if the Advisory 
Committee and the Congress intended to overrule the vast majority of cases excluding such evidence 
as lie detectors without explicitly stating so."). These authors, however, also remark: ··It is not clear 
whether Rule 703 is intended to codify the Frye test or whether it establishes a less demanding 
standard for scientific evidence." !d. 
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Those who argue that the Federal Rules repeal the Frye standard 253 focus 
on the language of the Rules. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." 254 Rule 402 mandates that "[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, by Act of Congress, by. these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." 255 Because scientific evidence 
could be shown to be reliable and thus relevant under Rule 401 without regard to 
its general acceptance in the scientific community, and because none of the ex-
clusions enumerated in Rule 402 is applicable, the Federal Rules have provided a 
standard of admissibility inconsistent with Frye. 256 Although this argument has 
considerable merit, jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), 
which contain a similar relevancy provision, have not accepted the argument. 257 
In addition, several constitutional principles raise questions about the con-
tinued validity of the general acceptance standard. The most important of these 
principles concerns a criminal defendant's right to present defense evidence. 258 
The cases applying this principle have involved polygraph evidence, one of the 
few scientific techniques that tends to be offered by the defense. In State v. 
Sims 259 an Ohio trial court found an implied right to present defense evidence in 
the compulsory process guarantee, which, it concluded, compelled admission of 
253. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 92. 
254. Fed. R. Evict. 401. 
255. Fed. R. Evict. 402. 
256. See State· v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500,. 503 (Me. 1978) ("The Maine Rules of Evidence 
[patterned after the Federal Rules] ... do not purport to estat;ish a special standard to govern the 
admissibility of testimony involving newly ascertained, or applied, scientific principles."). 
257. Uniform Rule 1(2) provides: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency in 
reason to prove any material fact." California and New Jersey have adopted rules of evidence based 
on the Uniform Rules, but nevertheless apply the Frye standard. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 
549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law 
Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N:J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). See also Jones, supra note 68, at 571-72. 
Even if a court found that Congress did not intend to overrule Frye by enacting the Federal 
Rules, the tension between Frye and the Federal Rules should, at the very least, cause judicial 
reevaluation of the general acceptance standard. Since Frye is a judicial creation and there is no 
evidence Congress intended to retain it, it could be overruled by the courts. 
258. In addition to the cases involving a defendant's right to present defense evidence, several 
cases have ruled polygraph evidence admissible on other grounds. In United States v. Hart, 344 F. 
Supp. 522 (E.D.N. Y. 1971), the court ruled that the results of a polygraph examination of a gov-
ernment witness, which indicated deception, was admissible under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). The court interpreted Brady as requiring the disclosure of "any evidence which may tend to 
exculpate a defendant." 344 F. Supp. at 523. Since the government initially thought the polygraph 
sufficiently reliable to conduct an examination, it had the burden, according fo the court, of explain-
ing why the test results should be excluded at trial. Hart was followed in State v. Christopher, 134 
N.J. Super. 263, 339 A.2d 239 (Law Div. 1975), rev'd, 149 N.J. Super. 269, 373 A.2d 705 (App. 
Div. 1977). New Jersey also follows the general acceptance standard. See State v. Cary, 99 N.J. 
Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). But see State 
v. Young, 89 Wash. 2d 613, 574 P.2d 1171, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978) (rejecting the Brady 
argument). 
259. 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. 1977). Ohio apparently adheres to the general 
acceptance standard. See State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975). 
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defense polygraph evi~ence. 260 In State v. Dorsey 261 a New Mexico appellate 
court upheld the admissibility of a defense-offered polygraph examination on due 
process grounds. The court based its decision on Chambers v. Mississippi, 262 in 
which the Supreme Court held that a state's evidentiary rules precluding the 
admission of critical and reliable defense evidence denied the defendant due pro-
cess under the circumstances of that case. Although the Court subsequently 
applied Chambers in Green v. Georgia, 263 it did not there clarify further the 
reliability requirement. Nevertheless, it may be that the Chambers reliability 
standard differs from the general acceptance standard, in which case the Frye 
test may be unconstitutional as applied to evidence offered by a criminal defen-
dant. 264 
Because of the problems outlined above, it is likely that more courts will 
consider jettisoning the Frye standard. Rejecting this test, however, would re-
quire the adoption of a different approach to the admissibility of novel scientific 
techniques. Some commentators have suggested a radical approach; others have 
advocated a return to a more traditional mode of analysis. The following sections 
investigate these alternatives. 
III. THE RADICAL APPROACH: 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS AND TRIBUNALS 
Several judges and commentators have advocated the creation of indepen-
dent bodies of experts who would be called upon to review novel scientific 
techniques before they could be used in court. This, of course, represents a 
radical departure c from present practice. The specifics of the various proposals 
differ in many significant respects. For example, Judge Kaplan sought the estab-
lishment of ad hoc commissions to advise the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts on the validity of polygraph 265 and voiceprint evidence. 266 Maletskos 
260. The Sims rationale finds some support in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), in 
which the Supreme Court, after holding that the compulsory process clause was binding upon the 
states, stated: "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if 
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense .... " !d. at 19. 
261. 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). But see 
United States v. Cavell, 156 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1957); State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 
568 P.2d 1061 (1977); State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976); State v. Maynard, 232 
N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1975). 
262. 4JO U.S. 284 (1973). 
263. 442 U.S. 95 (1979). In Masri v. United States, 434 U.S. 907 (1977), the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, over the dissents of Justices White and Marshall, in a case in which the admissibil-
ity of polygraph evidence was in issue. 
264. See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 73, 149-59 
(1974); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal 
Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 810-15 (1976); Note, Compulsory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does 
Exclusion Violate a Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights?, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 324 (1980); Note, 
Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55 Ind. L.J. 157 (1979). 
265. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421,452, 313 N.E.2d 120, 139 (1974) (dissenting 
opinion). See also dissenting opinion of Justice Quirico. !d. at 444, 313 N.E.2d at 134. 
266. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 212-13, 327 N.E.2d 671, 683 (1975) (dissenting 
opinion). 
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and Spielman proposed a "body or board ... to determine whether or not-.the 
scientific· innovation ... meets minimum, specified performance criteria and/or 
has scientific acceptability.'' 267 Under this approach certification by an inde-
pendent expert tribunal would be a prerequisite to admissiblity. 268 The proposed 
"Science Court" also could be used for this purpose. 269 
These proposals have several advantages over both the Frye and relevancy 
approaches. First, as under Frye, the initial screening function would be per-
formed by .a group of scientists. In contrast to Frye, however, evaluation would 
be organized, rather than haphazard. The Frye standard assumes that experts will 
adequately review each novel technique. Judical experience with the paraffin test 
casts doubt on this assumption. 270 Second, evaluation would be conducted by 
scientists without a financial or professional interest in the technique, thus ob-
viating the problem of partiality that has surfaced on a number of occasions. 271 
Third, such a tribunal could suggest areas of further research. A technique that 
has demonstrated potential but has not yet been sufficiently validated would not 
receive an unqualified veto, which might stifle future development and research. 
Unfortunately, none of these proposals ever has been adopted .. Nevertheless, 
the National Academy of Sciences' involvement in the voiceprint controversy 
represents an instructive development. 272 The FBI requested the Academy to 
review voiceprints 273 and presumably funded the evaluation. In effect, an inde-
pendent commission of experts has evaluated that technique. The LEAA can be 
criticized for failing to establish such an evaluative process as part of its proce-
dures. Voiceprint 274 and trace metal detection 275 research projects· were spon-
sored by the LEAA, but no independent evaluations of the studies were required. 
IV. THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS: 
THE RELEVANCY APPROACH 
Perhaps because the relevancy approach is viewed as a return to traditional 
analysis, it has received relatively little scrutiny. The emerging dissatisfaction 
267. Maletskos & Spielman, supra note 80, at 962. See also Note, The Admissibility of Bite 
Mark Evidence, supra note 6, at 33! (proposing a "review commillee of forensic odontologists" in 
bitemark cases). 
268. Maletskos & Spielman, supra note 80, at 962. 
269. See Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1058 (1977); Task Force of 
the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, The Science 
Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 Sci. 653 ( 1976); Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experi-
ment, 13 Trial 48 (March 1977); Boffey, Experiment Planned to Test Feasibility of A "Science 
Court," 193 Sci. 129 (1976); Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 1975 Am. Scien-
tist 505; Boffey, Science Court: High Officials Back Test of Controversial Concept, 194 Sci. 167 
(1976). 
270. See text accompanying notes 207-17 supra. 
271. See text accompanying notes 129-35 supra. 
272. See National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2. 
273. !d., Preface at vii. 
274. See note 12 supra. 
275. See note 12 supra. 
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with Frye and its possible rejection by the Federal Rules mandate a reexamina-
tion of this approach. 276 
A. McCormick's View: Coppolino v. State 
The relevancy approach is often associated with Professor McCormick and 
Coppolino v. State. 277 The precise formulation of McCormick's view, however, 
is difficult to discern, and Coppolino is even more confusing. 
In his 1954 text on evidence, McCormick wrote: 
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition upon the court's 
taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which 
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless 
there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative value 
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading 
the jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of time. 278 
This formulation has generated some confusion. Several courts have con-
cluded that under the McCormick view, lack of general acceptance plays no part 
in the trial judge's determination of admissibility. Thus, in Reed v. State 27 ~ the 
court stated: "McCormick ... believes that disagreement in the scientific com-
munity regarding the reliability of a scientific process should go to the weight 
rather than the admissibility of scientific evidence." 280 The case cited by 
McCormick in support of his position, McKay v. State, 281 would seem to con-
firm this interpretation. Nevertheless, immediately following the above quoted 
passage McCormick wrote: ''On this footing the novelty and want of acceptance 
[at the time Frye was decided] of the lie-detector lessened the probative value of 
276. Cases following this approach include United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E. D. Pa. 1974); United 
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972). See also State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1954); People v. Bobczyk, 343 
Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951); City of Abilene v. Hall, 202 Kan. 636,451 P.2d 188 (1969); 
McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950); I D. Louise]] & C. Mueller, supra 
note 59, at 825-26. 
277. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), 
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). 
278. C. McCormick, Evidence 363-64 (1954) (footnote omitted). 
279. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). 
280. ld. at 386-87, 391 A.2d at 370-71; accord, Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204, 
327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975) (stating McCormick's view as urging "that the opinions of a qualified 
expert should be received and that the considerations similar to those expressed in the Frye [case] 
... should be for the fact finder as to weight and value of the opinions."). See also United States v. 
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. De-
Betham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1383-84 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). 
281. 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 421, 235 S.W.2d 173, 175 (1950) ('"Dr. Beerstecher testified that the 
[Harger Drunkometer] is accurate and he gave his reasons for it. He admitted that there are others 
who disagree with its accuracy. The objection to his testimony, therefore, goes to its weight and not 
to its admissibility."). 
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the test and probably heightened the danger of misleading the jury." 282 This 
passage suggests that novelty and want of general acceptance are integral parts of 
the relevancy analysis. In short, the admissibility of the evidence, not just its 
weight, is affected by lack of general acceptance. 
An even more puzzling statement appears in a later section of McCormick's 
chapter on' scientific evidence. In discussing ihe polygraph, McCormick refers to 
his original comments on the general acceptance test and then observes: ''If we 
thus deflate the requirement [of general acceptance] to the normal standard which 
simply demands that the theory or device be accepted by a substantial body of 
scientific opinion, there can be little doubt that the lie-detector technique meets 
this requirement." 283 This passage seems to propose a "substantial accept-
ance" standard, an approach markedly different from the relevancy analysis. 
Indeed, a substantial acceptance standard would seem to come close to the Frye 
general acceptance standard, requiring the court to identify the field or profession 
in which the technique belongs and then to determine whether substantial accep-
tance has been achieved in that field. 284 
The leading case said to espouse the McCormick view, Coppolino v. 
State, 285 does not resolve these ambiguities. In that case the prosecution was 
allowed to introduce the results of a test that had not been accepted by the 
scientific community because it was developed specifically for the Coppolino 
trial. 286 Although the appellate court cited Frye, it nevertheless upheld the ad-
282. C. McCormick, supra note 278, at 364 (emphasis added). This passage was deleted from the 
second edition of McCormick. See C. McCormick, Evidence 491 (2d ed .. 1972). 
283.· C. McCormick, supra note 278, at 371-72 (emphasis added). This passage was also deleted 
from the second edition of McCormick. See C. McCormick, Evidence 506-07 (2d ed. 1972). 
284. McCormick's other works on expert testimony and scientific evidence do not resolve these 
difficulties. See McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 484, 499 
(1927) (mentioning Frye but not in a critical manner); McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 
Nw. L. Rev. 218, 224 (1956) (citing McKay); McCormick, Science, Experts and the Courts, 29 Tex. 
L. Rev. 611 (1951); McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 
23 Tex. L. Rev. 109 (1945) .. 
Dean Wigmore seems to have advocated a similar standard. See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 
990, at 922 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) ("All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary 
testimony of a scientist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a 
reasonable measure of precision in its indications.") (psychological evidence); 3 J. Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 795, at 245 (x-ray instrument accepted by profession); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 659, at 
771 (3d. ed. 1940) (accepted in branch of learning); J. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof 450 
(3d ed. 1937) ("The type of apparatus purporting to be constructed on scientific principles must be 
accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose by the profession concerned in that branch of 
science or its related art."). 
285. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), 
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 ( 1970). See generally F. Bailey, The Defense Never Rests 224-28 (1971 ). 
The validity of the evidence introduced in Coppolino is still the source of controversy. Newsweek 
reported that evidence favorable to the defense concerning the tests in Coppolino was allegedly 
supressed. Newsweek, May 7, 1979, at 16. 
The second edition of McCormick's work cites Coppolino as the approach "which should be 
followed in respect to expert testimony and scientific evidence generally." C. McCormick, supra 
note 23, at 491. See also United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.) (citing McCormick and 
Coppolino), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); A. Moenssens & F. Jnbau, supra note 7 at 6-7; I 
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 59, at 103; Strong, supra note 19, at 16. 
286. The prosecution attempted to prove that the defendant had murdered his wife by administer-
ing a fatal dose of succinylcholine chloride. At the time of trial the medical profession had not 
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missibility of the evidence on the ground that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion. 287 Coppolino thus ignores rather than rejects Frye. More impor-
tantly, it neither endorses the McCormick approach nor offers any alternative 
standard; it merely recognizes trial judge discretion. 
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
In contrast to Coppolino, the Federal Rules of Evidence map out the steps 
involved in applying the relevancy analysis. Assuming that the Federal Rules 
were intended to reject Frye, 288 the admissibility of a novel scientific technique 
would depend on a three-step process: first, the probative value of the evidence 
would be determined; second, dangers such as the potential of the evidence to 
mislead the jury would be identified; and third, the probative value would be 
balanced against the identified dangers. The next section demonstrates the prob-
lems posed by these threshold requirements and explains why the safeguards of 
the adversial system are insufficient to overcome them. 
1. Threshold Requirements 
a. Probative Value. The first step requires an assessment of the probative 
value of the proffered evidence. Federal Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than ·it would be without the evidence. " 289 Since the "law furnishes no test of 
relevancy," 290 the judge must rely on "logic" 291 and "experience to evaluate 
the probabilities on which relevancy turns." 2 n The probative value of scien-
tific evidence, however, is connected inextricably to its reliability; 293 if the 
technique is not reliable, evidence derived from the technique is not relevant. 294 
Because the judge in most cases cannot resort to logic and experience to evaluate 
the probative value of a noveJ:technique, he must turn to science. The Advisory 
recognized a method for detecting succinylcholine chloride or its derivatives in human tissues. 223 
So. 2d at 70, 75. 
287. I d. at 70. 
288. See text accompanying notes 240-57 supra. 
289. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
290. J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the. Common Law 265 ( 1898). 
291. See Comment, Uniform Rule of Evidence 1(2) (1953) ("The only test of relevancy is 
logic.") See also J. Thayer, supra note 290, at 265. 
292. I J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, at 401-07. See also United States v. Williams, 
545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976); James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689, 
696 n.l5, 704 (1941); Kom, supra note 17, at 1110-11. 
293. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("The acceptance 
of the basic theory [of the polygraph] is a part of the process of making the evidence relevant."); 
United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1384 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Boyce, 
Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev. 313, 314 (1964); 
Jones, supra note 68, at 571, Strong, supra note 19, at 14. 
Of course, the relevancy of all evidence is affected by its reliability. See note 379 infra. 
294. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. 
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Committee's Note accompanying Federal Rule 401 specifically alludes to this 
possibility. 2 H5 
If the technique has a "track record," then its acceptance by a profession 
would be circumstantial proof of its reliability. 2 H6 This reasoning may explain 
McCormick's belief that lack of general acceptance affected probative value. 297 
If the technique, as in Coppolino, has been applied for the first time in the very 
case in which the judge is asked to rule on its admissibility, the judge obviously 
cannot rely on the track record. However, if the judge does not have a scientific 
background to assist him, as is usually the case, on what does he rely? Professor 
Strong predicts that "in the case of scientific evidence the court wiii generaiiy be 
forced to accept the probative value of the evidence as what a qualified expert 
testifies it to be." 2 H8 Thus, probative value could be established by the asser-
tions of one expert. ZHH Furthefrnore, it ·is not enough for the judge to determine 
295. In drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory Committee rejected the formulation 
of relevancy found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), because it overemphasized the "logical 
process" to the detriment of "experience or. scfence." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
401. See also Uniform R. Evid. 1(2) (1953) (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any 
tendency in reason to prove any material fact"); I J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, at 
401-28 to -29 ("In an earlier internal working draft of Rule 401, relevant evidence was defined in 
terms of ·evidence having any tendency on the basis of logic and experience or technical or other 
specialized knowledge ... .' "). 
296. See Moenssens, supra note 43, at 18. 
297. See text accompanying note 282 supra. 
298. Strong, supra note 19, at 22 (emphasis added). 
299. Like the Frye standard, the relevancy approach depends on the quality of expe1t testimony. 
See Strong, supra note 19, at 14-15. A court's failure to impose a demanding standard on the 
qualifications of experts, however, is more important under the relevancy approach, because the 
stringent requirements of Frye no longer provide a backstop to admissibility. As noted earlier, the 
trial judge is given considerable leeway in determining the qualifications of experts, and his decision 
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See note 195 supra. Unfortunately, this means in 
many cases that the "standards applied are often quite ·loose." Korn, supra note 17, at 1084. For 
example, in Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978), evidence derived from the trace 
metal detection tec~nique (TMDT) was admitted to show that a homicide defendant had recently held 
a metal object, possibly a handgun. The defendant challenged both the reliability of the technique 
and the qualifications of the government expert. The expert testified that 
his knowledge concerning the TMDT came from a seminar presented by the manufac-
turer of the chemical solution, written instructions that accompanied the chemical and 
his personal experience in conducting such tests upon approximately fifteen occasions. 
He admitted that he had no understanding of the reason for the reaction that occurred 
when such test was administered. 
Id. at 559, 372 N.E.2d at 1152. Nevertheless, the court found no error in the trial court's determina-
tion that the witness was qualified, a decision that, according to the court, is "generally left to the 
trial court's sound discretion." !d. at 560, 372 N.E.2d at 1152. 
The cavalier attitude of the court in Reid is extremely troublesome. The court by its own admis-
sion believed it was confronting an issue of first impression-the first case upholding the admissibil-
ity of TMDT. No opposing experts were presented, and the prosecution's expert was, in fact, only a 
technician; he did not know why the reaction occurred and thus could not testify whether the same 
reaction could have resulted from objects other than a gun. Moreover, the court cited no articles or 
other publications to support its conclusions. Instead, the court offered a barren and unadorned con-
clusion: "[W]e believe[] [TMDT] is generally recognized as reliable." !d. at 559, 372 N.E.2d at 
I !52. See also State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973). The court was 
apparently unaware that TMDT had been rejected previously in People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 
398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977), because there was "absolutely no testimony before the court as 
to this test having been received in any court or in the literature of forensic science; nor is there any 
scientific data presented to show the reliability of this test." !d. at 712, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 507. A 
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that the evidence meets the minimum relevancy standard under Rule 40 I. Be-
cause the judge will be required, under Rule 403, to balance the probative value 
against any accompanying dangers, he must have some idea of the probative 
worth of the evidence. Thus, the process of evaluating the probative value of 
novel techniques presents a fundamental difficulty in the relevancy approach. 
b. Dangers. The major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mis-
lead the jury; 300 an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and 
thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny. Other factors, such as 
undue prejudice, confusion of issues, and waste of time, may be associated with 
scientific evidence, but often these factors overlap with the danger of misleading 
the jury or are of only secondary importance. Here, unlike the assessment of the 
probative value of novel scientific evidence, the trial judge appears to be on 
familiar turf; 301 evaluating the misleading aspects of evidence is a problem 
judges face in admitting or excluding nonscientific evidence. Thus, while ··an 
exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique [may 
make] its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury,'' 302 a trial judge would be 
expected to understand this problem. Moreover, a judge would be expected to 
appreciate how a technique that involves the use of instrumentation might also 
overimpress a jury. 303 Similarly, some scientific techniques do not require the 
jury to rely totally on the expert's opinion. In admitting evidence of bitemark 
comparisons, one -court observed: "[T]he basic data on which the experts based 
their conclusions were verifiable by the court'' and thus the jury could arrive at 
its own evaluation independently. 304 In contrast, other techniques require al-
most total reliance on the expert. 305 The trial judge presumably would be capa-
ble of making such discriminations in considering a jury's ability to evaluate 
novel scientific techniques. 
Nevertheless, determining the extent to which a jury will be misled in-
volves, in many cases, an understanding of the limitations of a particular 
better approach to the qualification issue is found in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972), in which the court, in admitting polygraph evidence, stated: ''In this case it is not 
sufficient for a person to testify that he has the minimum qualifications of an expert and thus be 
allowed to testify." !d. at 96. The court used its power to appoint independent experts to control the 
quality of expert testimony. 
300. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific evidence may 
''assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen."); United States v. Wilson, 
361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 95 (E.D. Mich. 
1972); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 493 (1968). See also I J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, at 403-27; 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, § 
5217, at 295. 
301. See Strong, supra note 19, at 22. 
302. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). 
303. See Strong, supra note 19, at 13. 
304. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d !00, Ill, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975) (relying on 
independent judgment of trier of fact). See also Comment, supra note 3, at 402 ("The procedures 
used in statistical analysis of style are not so alien to the layman as are the processes involved in 
other scientific fields."). 
305. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975) ("[T]he trier of 
fact is required to rely on the testimony of the polygrapher, verified at most by marks on a graph, to 
which the expert's hypothesis gives some relevant meaning. Similar total reliance on the expert's 
assumptions is required for voice spectrogram."). 
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technique. This in tum requires knowledge of the technique, and again makes 
the court dependent upon the expert's assertions. Overstatements by experts 
about the conclusions that can be drawn from various scientific techniques are 
not uncommon. For example, neutron activation analysis has been characterized 
as being ''as infallible as ... fingerprints.'' 306 Similarly, unqualified asser-
tions have been made for bitemark 307 and voiceprint evidence. 308 Indeed, the 
term "voiceprint" has been_ criticized for drawing an unwarranted analogy be-
tween voice spectrographic analysis· and fingerprint identification. 308 
Of course, 'if the trial judge is knowledgeable about the technique~ this prob-
lem can be solved by exercising a tighter rein on the expert's testin1ony. If, 
however, the judge is not knowledgeable-if he does not know, for example, 
that activation analysis and voiceprint identifications are markedly different from 
fingerprints- he cannot appreciate the extent to which the jury is being misled. 
One solution emphasized by some courts is to require a cautionary instruc-
tion.310 Again, however, lack of knowledge limits the efficacy of this device. 
Without scientific knowledge, only a general cautionary instruction can be given. 
While such an instruction may be helpful in alerting the jury to the importance 
of evaluating the reliability of the technique, it ''fails to assist the jurors in [that] 
task." 311 
306. State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 420, 260 A.2d 547, 560 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 
403 U.S. 443 ( 1971). But see Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 
supra note I, at 1029 (The comparison with fingerprints "~an be quite misleading."). In upholding 
the admission of evidence of a gunshot residue test based upon neutron activmion analysis, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court remarked: 
We are concerned, however, about the sweeping and unqualified manner in which [the 
expert's] testimony was offered. Where expert testimony concerning a new scientific 
technique is heard by a jury, there is danger that the evidence may be given more 
weight than is warranted. 
An expert witness could be permitted to testify that in his opinion the chemicals 
present on defendant's hand may have resulted from firing a gun. He should not have 
been permitted to stale, as he did, that this defendant had definitely fired a gun. 
State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 461, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134 (1974). 
307. Compare State v. Garrison, !20 Ariz. 255, 258, 585 P .2d 563, 566 ( !978) (Expert testified 
"that there is an eight in one million probability that the teeth marks found on the deceased's breast 
were not made by appellant."), with People v. Slone, 76 CaL App. 3d 611, 62 I, I 43 CaL Rptr. 61, 
67 (1978) (Expert testified that "it is very highly probable that the bite mark on the victim was 
perpetrated by teeth belonging to the defendant."). 
308. The developer of the voiceprint technique repeatedly used the fingerprint analogy in his 
testimony. Sec United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. !83, 191,37 C.M.R. 447,455 (1967) (dissent-
ing opinion) ("[V]oiceprints are practically the equivalent of fingerprints in reliability."); People v. 
King, 266 CaL App. 2d 437, 442, 72 CaL Rptr. 478, 481 (1968) (" 'voiceprint' method of identifica-
tion [defended] as having the infallibility of fingerprints"); State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 334, 
239 A.2d 680, 685 (Law Div. 1968), remanded, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), aff'd, 56 N.J. 
16, 264 A.2d 209 ( 1970) (expert ''claims that [voiceprint identification] is virtually infallible"). 
309. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
I ll7 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463,465 n.l (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 
(1975). 
310. See UniteJ States v. Williams, 583 F.2d !194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
I l 17 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463. 467 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 
(1975); People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 881-82, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In 
Williams the court quoted an instruction that it described as "excellent." 583 F.2d at 1200 n. 13. 
31 I. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 47. Moreover, the efficacy of jury instruc-
tion seems questionable. See generally LS.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 
1980] SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1239 
c. Balancing. The final step in the relevancy analysis is balancing the prob-
ative value of the proffered evidence against the danger of misleading the jury. 
As noted above, 312 assessing the probative worth of a novel scientfic technique 
and its potential for misleading the jury will often result in reliance on the opin-
ion of one or two experts. This problem is exacerbated by the requirement of 
Federal Rule 403 that the danger of misleading the jury substantially outweigh 
probative value before exclusion is appropriate. 313 Moreover, appellate courts 
will defer to the trial court's discretion when reviewing this issue. 314 
2. The Adversary Process 
As the problems presented above indicate, it is questionable whether the 
initial screening of novel techniques under the relevancy approach will 
adequately protect against the admission of unreliable scientific evidence. In con-
trast to Frye, however, the relevancy approach does not attempt to assure the 
reliability .of novel techniques prior to admission. To be sure, under the rele-
vancy approach some techniques will be excluded by the trial judge; but most 
will pass the threshold requirements of admissibility, at which stage deficiencies 
should be exposed before the jury through traditional adversary trial procedures. 
Courts adopting the relevancy approach have emphasized this point. For exam-
ple, in upholding the admissibility of voiceprint evidence in United States v. 
Baller, 315 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit commented: ''Unless an 
exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its 
use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scien-
tific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight 
to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation." 316 
Thus, one of the underlying assumptions of the relevancy approach is that 
the jury is capable of evaluating novel scientific evidence. For example, in ap-
plying the relevancy approach to polygraph evidence, the court in United States 
v. Ridling 317 stated: 
[I]t is important to understand how different juries are today than they 
were when the restrictive rules of evidence were first developed. On 
the whole they read widely. Largely because of television they know 
generally what is going on in the world. Their educational background 
Crim. L. Rev. 208, 221-22; Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on 
the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969, I 002-05 ( 1977). 
312. See text accompanying notes 289-311 supra. 
313. Fed. R. Evict. 403. 
314. See C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 440; 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 
309. 
315. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). 
316. ld. at 466 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("The evidence is 
admitted for its worth, and the expert who attempts to make more from it than he should seldom 
survives a good cross-examination.") (emphasis added). 
317. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
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is extensive. They think. They reason. They are really very good at 
sorting out good evidence from bad, of separating the credible witness 
from the incredible, and of disregarding experts who attempt to inject 
their opinions into areas of which they have little knowledge. 318 
Unfortunately, empirical support for this view is lacking. The few available 
studies, 3 B mostly involving the impact of polygraph evidence on jury delibera-
tions, are inconclusive. 32° Considering the techniques that may be involved-
neutron activation analysis, atomic absorption, and ion microprobic analysis-
the assumption of jury capability provides a shaky foundation upon which to 
construct an approach to admissibility of novel scientific techniques. 
A second assumption underlying the relevancy approach is that unreliable 
novel scientific evidence will be exposed through the adversary process. The 
specific safeguards afforded by the adversary process will be examined in the 
context of criminal trials, in which the consequences of an erroneous judgment 
based upon unreliable scientific evidence are of most importance. 321 
a. Notice. Effective cross-examination and refutation presuppose adequate 
notice and discovery of the evidence the opposing party intends to introduce at 
trial. This is especially true of challenges to evidence based upon innovative 
scientific procedures, which inevitably require extensive preparation, including 
identification of and consultation with experts. Ward v. State, 322 a case involv-
ing neutron activation analysis, illustrates the problems criminal defendants have 
encountered in this respect. In Ward, a rape-murder trial, the prosecution intro-
duced the resulrs of microscopic comparison of pubic hairs discovered at the 
318. !d. at 98. See also Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613,616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (concur-
ring opinion) ("My faith in the jury system leads me to believe that [the scientific evidence] will be 
given the weight that the situation and circumstances may dictate.'') 
In contrast, courts favoring the Frye standard voice concern that scientific evidence may "as-
sume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen," United States v. Addison, 
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974), or may be "shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to 
the ancient oracle of Delphi." United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, !68 (8th Cir. 1975). 
3 I 9. See Barnett, How Does a Jury View Polygraph Examination Results?, 2 Polygraph 275 
( 1973); Carlson, Passano & Jannuzzo, The Effect of the Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Deliberations; 
An Empirical Study, 5 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 148 (1977); Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts. 
16 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 202, 228-30 (1939); Koffler, The Lie Detector-A Critical Appraisal of the 
Technique as a Potential Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y.L.F. 123, 138-46 
(1957); Tarlow, supra note 59, 968-69; Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on 
Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 324 (1979). See also Greene, Voiceprint Iden-
tification: The Case in Favor of Admissibility, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 171, 190-91 (1975). 
The results of one survey of prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, and trial judges indicated 
that lawyers and judges believe scientific evidence to have a significant impact on juries. See 0. 
Schroeder, A Legal Study Concerning the Forensic Sciences Personnel (1977). In response to the 
question "Does scientific evidence have more credibility than lay witness testimony?", I 054 lawyers 
and judges answered "yes", and 188 answered "no". In response to the question "Is scientific 
evidence given more credibility than other evidence by decision-maker [jury]?", 958 answered 
"yes", and 221 answered "no". !d. at 14. 
320. See Markwart & Lynch, supra note 319, at 324 ("Relatively little research has been con-
ducted in this area, and what has been done has yielded conflicting results."). 
321. The overwhelming majority of cases involving the admissibility of novel scientific techniques 
have been criminal prosecutions. See cases cited in notes 1-7 supra. 
322. 427 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). 
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crime scene with hair exemplars obtained from the defendant. The analysis was 
performed by a member of the Toxicology and Chemistry Division of the Hous-
ton Police Department. During the subsequent cross-examination of a different 
prosecution expert, the defense attorney suggested that neutron activation, rather 
than microscopic, analysis would have been a superior method of examination. 
The prosecution then recalled the hair examiner who testified that the hair 
exemplars also had been subjected to activation analysis and that, in his opinion, 
the samples "were identical and probably came from the same person." 323 The 
expert in Ward was employed by a city crime laboratory, and thus it is unlikely 
that he would have had the educational and practical background to conduct this 
type of sophisticated examination. 324 In addition, his testimony that the samples 
"were identical and probably came from the same person" was "highly vul-
nerable." 325 Nonetheless, these issues were not pursued, perhaps because the 
defense attorneys acknowledged they were caught off guard. 326 While Ward 
may represent great trial tactics, it surely represents a poor use of scientific 
evidence. 327 
The party offering evidence based upon a novel technique should be re-
quired to provide sufficient advance notice to the adversary. 328 Moreover, this 
323. ld. at 884. 
324. In other neutron activation cases the experts have been associated with major federal or 
university laboratories. E.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970) (Postal Service 
Laboratory), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972) (Uni-
versity of Missouri); State v. Coolidge, I 09 N.H. 403, 260 A. 2d 54 7 (1969) (U.S. Treasury 
Laboratory), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
325. Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra note I, at 1036 
n.216. 
326. Id., citing Jetter from the defense attorney in Ward. 
327. In United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit took a different view of such tactics. In Kelly, the court reversed the defendant's conviction 
because the defense had not been notified that the results of activation analysis of drugs would be 
introduced at trial. The court observed: 
While the newness of the test is not itself reason for depriving the jury of its results, and 
the opportunity to weigh conflicting claims as to its reliability, fairness requires that 
adequate notice be given the defense to check the findings and conclusions of the gov-
ernment's experts .... The course of the government smacks too much of a trial by 
ambush .... 
ld. at 29. In Kelly the defendant requested discovery of scientific tests, and consequently the holding 
rested upon the prosecution's continuing duty to disclose under Federai Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(c). Had the defendant not made such a request, "trial by ambush" might have been permitted. 
The defendant in State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971), modified, 408 
U.S. 939 (1972), attempted to rely on Kelly in challenging the prosecution's use of neutron activation 
analysis. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, readily distinguished Kelly, because Ohio, at that time, 
did not have a discovery provision comparable to the federal rule.relied upon in Kelly. See also State 
v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10, 24 (Mo.) (failure to notify defendant of NAA not error where no request 
made), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). ' 
328. For example, one commentary has noted: 
[S)urprise should play no role in litigation featuring the introduction of unfamiliar scien-
tific information. 
Within the context of the adversarial system, it might be appropriate to impose an 
affirmative obligation for disclosure on parties who contemplate the introduction of evi-
dence produced by innovative techniques, and to condition the amount and the timing of 
required disclosure on the complexity and novelty of the process . 
Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 5, at 1445 (footnote omitted). 
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requirement should not depend on a request for discovery, but should be an 
affirmative duty. Notice provisions are not uncommon; both the Federal· Rules of 
Evidence 329 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 330 contain such provi-
sions. Such a requirement is especially important because the modern trend has 
been to refuse to recognize unfair surprise as a legitimate ground for excluding 
relevant evidence. 331 
b. Discovery. Even when pro_cedural rules provide for the discovery of the 
results of scientific tests, 332 the defendant may not receive all the necessary 
information. Many laboratory reports reveal only the results of the examina-
tion. 333 Other critical information, such as the nature of the tests performed, the 
procedures employed, and the qualifications of the examiner, are not furnished. 
In most jurisdictions, this information cannot be obtained by deposition because 
depositions in criminal cases are limited to the preservation of testimony and are 
not permitted for the purpose of discovery. 334 Moreover, in many forensic pro-
cedures the evidence is either consumed during analysis or otherwise not pre-
served. Thus, discovery provisions providing for re-examination of evidence by 
defense experts335 may prove _ineffectual. 
Full disclosure, including written reports and depositions, should be man-
dated in this context. None of the usual reasons for limiting discovery in crimi-
nal cases applies to experts. As the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and 
Procedure Before Trial note: "[I]t is virtually impossible for evidence or infor-
mation of this kind to be distorted or misused because of its advance disclo-
sure." 336 In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a), whic)l is applicable in 
criminal as well as in civil cases, authorizes deposition of a court-appointed 
expert. 337 Judge Weinstein has commented that this provision "can be justified 
on the grounds that an examination into the expert's findings will enable the 
parties to better prepare for examination and cross-examination thereby increas-
ing the likelihood 'that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly de-
termined.' " 338 This rationale is equally applicable to all experts, not only 
329. See Fed. R. Evict. 412(c)(l) (character evidence in rape cases); Fed. R. Evict. 803(24) & 
804(b)(5) (residual hearsay exceptions). See also Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(b); Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.02 
(evidence of prior bad acts). 
330. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2 (insanity). 
331. See Fed. R. Evict. 403. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 states: "The rule does 
not enumerate surprise as a ground for exclusion .... " 
332. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(D). 
333. An example of a typical laboratory report is reproduced in United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 
517, 525 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974). 
334. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1976). In contrast, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorize the use of depositions for discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a). There are, however, a few jurisdictions that authorize discovery depositions in criminal cases. 
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(d); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 517:!3; Vt. R. Crim. P. 15(a). See generally 
Note, Discovery Depositions: A Proposed Right for Criminal Defendants, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 467 
( 1978). 
335. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C). 
336. ABA, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial 67 (1969). 
337. Fed. R. Evict. 706(a). 
338. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 28, at 706-17 to -18. 
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court-appointed experts, and is especially critical m cases m which novel 
techniques are introduced. 
Moreover, a duty to preserve evidence so as to provide the defense with the 
opportunity to retest it should be considered part of the government's discovery 
obligation. The trend is to recognize this duty. 33 ~ In United States v. Stifel, 340 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, after upholding the admissibility of 
neutron activation analysis, stated: "[I]f the government sees fit to use this time 
consuming, expensive means of fact-finding, it must both allow time for a de-
fendant to make similar tests, and in the instance of an indigent defendant, a 
means to provide for payment for same." 341 The defendant's right to retest 
evidence 342 carries with it a corollary duty on the part of the government to 
preserve the evidence. 
c. Defense Experts. Securing the services of experts to examine evidence, to 
advise counsel, and to rebut the prosecution's case is probably the single most 
critical factor in defending a case in which novel scientific evidence is intro-
duced. 343 Nevertheless, a surprising number of novel techniques have gained 
admissibility without the presentation of defense expert testimony. 344 Incredi-
bly, several courts have cited the absence of opposing experts to support their 
decision to admit voiceprints, apparently inferring reliability from a lack of op-
position.345 This inference is unwarranted. 
339. See People v. Hitch, II Cal. 3d 159, 520 P.2d 974, 113 Cal. Rptr. 158, vacated, 12 Cal. 3d 
641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); People v. Gomez,-Colo.-, 596 P.2d 1192 (1979); 
Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470 (Fla. App. 1971), writ discharged, 280 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1973); 
People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App. 3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 573 (1977). See generally Note, The Right to 
Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1355 (1975); Note, Criminal Procedure-Preservation of Due Process When Evidence is Destroyed 
or Tested, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 573 (1978); Comment, Judicial Response to Government Loss or 
Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 542 ( 1972); Comment, Criminal Procedure: Govern-
ment Has Duty to Implement Effective Guidelines to Preserve Discoverable Evidence, 1971 Duke L. 
J. 644. 
340. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). 
341. !d. at 441. 
342. Several courts have recognized that a defendant's right to reexamine scientific evidence is 
constitutionally based. See White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977); Barnard v. Henderson, 
514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973); Patterson v. 
State, 238 Ga. 204, 232 S. E. 2d 233, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977); Jackson v. Stale, 243 So. 
2d 396 (Miss. 1970). Moreover, the recent study by the Forensic Sciences Foundation demonstrating 
the errors that frequently occur in crime laboratory analysis also supports this right. See note 60 
supra. 
343. See United Stales v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) ("[l]l is difficult to rebut such an 
opinion except by other experts or by cross-examination based on a thorough acquaintance with the 
underlying principles."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). 
344. See National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2, at 49; People v. Chapter, 13 Crim. L. 
Rep. (BNA) 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five 
[voiceprint] cases in which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert 
testimony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability by the scientific community .... "). 
Kalven and Zeisel, in their study of the American jury system, also noted the disparity between 
defense and prosecution use of expert witnesses: "Again, the imbalance between prosecution and 
defense appears. In 22 per cent of the cases the prosecution has the only expert witness, whereas in 
only 3 per cent of the cases does the defense have such an advantage." H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The 
American Jury 139 (1966). 
345. See United Stales v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 ( 1975); 
United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53-54 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
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The underlying problem is that the ·'burden of rebuttal is generally borne in 
these criminal cases by defendants without the economic means to marshal scien-
tific witnesses for a battle of the experts.'' 346 In contrast, the prosecution has 
ready access to expert witnesses and laboratory facilities. All states and most 
large metropolitan areas have government-operated forensic laboratories. sn In 
addition, federal laboratories provide services to local and state law enforcement 
agencies. The FBI laboratory, for example, is "available without charge to all 
duly constituted state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies of the 
United States and its territorial possessions.'' 348 This includes both the exami-
nation of evidence and the court appearance of the expert. 
This advantage takes on added significance with new techniques, many of 
which involve sophisticated and expensive equipment. Securing defense experts 
is essential both for the court's assessment of relevancy and for the jury's evalua-
tion of reliability. 348 The need of indigent defendants for expert assistance is 
met in some instances by statutory provisions. 350 In addition, the right to com-
pulsory process, 351 to the effective assistance of counsel, 352 to due process, 353 
346. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978) (concurring opinion). 
347. See A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, supra note 7, at 8-9 & 17. For a listing of crime laboratories, 
seeR. Fox & C. Cunningham, Crime Scene Search and Physical Evidence Handbook 174-85 (1974). 
348. Williams, The FBI Laboratory-Its Availability and Use by Prosecutors from Investigation 
to Trial, 28 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 95, 99 (1960). See also Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hand-
book of Forensic Science 5 (Rev. ed. I 978). 
349. See Coleman & Walls, The Evaluation of Scientific Evidence, 1974 Crim. L. Rev. (England) 
276, 280. 
350. See A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, supra note 7, at 10 n.l9 ("About half of the states and the 
federal government have specific provisions under which courts are authorized to provide for public 
compensation of defense experts. A number of other states have statutes which allow appointed 
counsel to recover his expenses, including, in some of these states, fees of experts."). The Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e) (1976) provides for such costs. See generally, 3 C. 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 740 (I 969); Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. l 007 ( 1971 ). 
351. In People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966), the court commented: 
The court recognizes that there is a distinction between the right to call witnesses 
and the right to have these witnesses paid for by the government, but in certain instances 
involving indigents, the lack of funds with which to pay for the witness will often 
preclude him from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him from offering a 
defense. Thus, although the defendant is afforded the shadow of the right to call wit-
nesses, he is deprived of the substance. 
!d. at 233, 221 N.E.2d at 648. 
352. See Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 
560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964) ("But the right to counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to make 
an effective defense because he has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which the case 
reguires. "), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965). See also ABA, Standards Relating to Providing 
Defense Services 23 ( !967) ("The guality of representation at trial may be excellent and yet value-
less to the defendant if his defense requires . the services of a handwriting expert and no such 
services are available."). 
353. See United States ex rei. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965) ("(T]he 
denial of a reasonable reguest to obtain the services of a necessary psychiatric witness is effectually a 
suppression of evidence violating the fundamental right of due process."), aff'd in part, remanded in 
part on other grounds, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) 
("Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own de-
fense."). 
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and to equal protection 354 seem to support such a right. 355 Nevertheless, a 
number of courts have refused to recognize the right to the assistance of ex-
perts.356 As a last resort, the trial court should exercise its power to appoint an 
expert for the court. 357 
Provisions for notice, full discovery, the opportunity to re-examine evi-
dence, and the appointment of defense experts are critical components of the 
relevancy approach. While it is true that "manipulation of the rules of evi-
dence" 358 will not solve these problems, courts lowering the barriers of 
admissibility-even the uneven barrier erected by Frye-cannot ignore the pro-
cedural setting in which scientific evidence is introduced. 
V. A PROPOSAL: ·THE BURDEN 
OF PROVING RELIABILITY 
Even with the procedural safeguards discussed above, it seems questionable 
whether the relevancy approach will adequately protect against the misuse of 
unreliable novel scientific evidence. The voiceprint cases provide a useful illus-
tration of the problem. In United States v. Wright , 35 ~ the admissibility of voice-
print evidence was upheld for the first time by an appellate court. The developer 
of the voice'print technique testified that the method was valid ("virtually infalli-
ble''). 360 Apparently, all the procedural safeguards enumerated above were pres-
ent. Notice and discovery were provided; opposing experts testified. 361 In addi-
tion, although the qualifications of the government expert have been questioned, 362 
he was obviously more than a technician, and permitting him to testify as an 
expert was probably not erroneous. Moreover, the impact of the voiceprint evi-
dence must have been significant because it identified the defendant as the per-
son who committed the charged offense. 363 
354. See Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1965) ("It is obvious that only his 
inability to pay for the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper presentation of his case."); cf. 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) 
(right to transcript). 
355. See generally Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational 
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632 ( 1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition 
to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 1054 (1963); Note, Criminal Law: 
Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L.J. 137 (1971); Annol., 34 
A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970). · " 
356. E.g., United States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Watson v. Patterson, 358 
F.2d 297 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966); Stidham v. State, 507 P.2d 1312 (Okla. 
Crim. 1973); Huitt v. State, 562 P.2d 873 (Okla. Crim. 1977). See also Anno!., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 
(I 970). 
357. See Fed. R. Evict. 706(a). "The inherent power of a trial judge to appoint ari expert of his 
own choosing is virtually unquestioned." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evict. 706. See also 
C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 37-38; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 563, at 648 (3d ed. 1940). 
358. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 46, at 91. 
359. 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967). 
360. !d. at 193, 37 C.M.R. at 457 (dissenting opinion). 
361. Two defense experts testified in Wright. 
362. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra. 
363. See 17 C.M.A. at 194, 37 C.M.R. at 458. ("[T)he evidence other than the voiceprints is far 
from compelling .... In short, the Government has made it clear from the beginning that its main 
prop here was the 'scientific' evidence .... ") (dissenting opinion). 
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Voiceprint evidence should not have been admitted in Wright. The 
technique had not been sufficiently validated at that time. Indeed, it is debatable 
whether the technique has been sufficiently validated today. 364 Nevertheless, 
under the circumstances presented in Wright, admitting voiceprint evidence was 
not improper under the relevancy approach. 365 Under that approach, the court, 
as illustrated by Wright, too often will "be forced to accept the probative value 
of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies it to be.'' 366 Even if oppos-
ing experts testify, frequently they will be able to testify only that the technique 
has not been sufficiently validated, not that the technique is invalid. 367 Such 
testimony rarely will result in exclusion since, under the Federal Rules, the 
probative value of proffered evidence must be substantially outweighed by coun-
tervailing dangers before exclusion is proper. 
If Wright had been a civil case, the adoption of the relevancy approach 
might have been acceptable. A criminal case, however, is a different matter. The 
introduction of unreliable evidence that has a significant potential to influence a 
jury greatly increases the likelihood of an erroneous verdict. 368 In effect, the 
relevancy approach places the burden on the party opposing admissibility 36u-
typically the defendant in a criminal case. Instead of the prosecution carrying a 
substantial burden of establishing the reliability of a novel scientific technique, 
the defendant must shoulder the burden of establishing unreliability. This Article 
takes the position that a special burden should be placed on the admissibility of 
novel scientific evidence. 370 As one court has observed: 
A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution should not hang on his ability to successfully 
rebut scientific evidence which bears an "aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness," although, in reality the witness is testifying on the 
basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated experiment which has 
yet to gain general acceptance in its field. 371 
Once it is determined that a special burden should be imposed on the ad-
missibility of novel scientific evidence, the formulation of that burden becomes 
364. See National Academy of Sciences, supra note 2. 
365. While it is clear that the Wright court did not apply the Frye test, see note 185 supra, it is 
not as clear that the relevancy approach was used. 
366. Strong, supra note 19, at 22. 
367. In Wright the court dismissed the testimony of the opposing experts in one sentence: "True, 
two defense expert witnesses expressed reservations as to the complete reliability of Mr. Kersta's 
system and procedures." 17 C.M.A. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 453. 
368. See Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 
278-80 (1975). 
369. See Latin, Tannehill & \Vhite, supra note 5, at 1377-7.8. 
370. Because of the unreliability problems associated with novel scientific evidence, several advo-
cates of scientific evidence have conceded that the Frye standard may be necessary. See A. 
Moenssens & F. lnbau, supra note 7, at 7-8 and 584. Professor Moenssens's earlier views on Frve 
were extremely critical. See. Moenssens, supra note 43. See also Coleman & Walls, supra note 349, 
at 281 (urging caution in the use of scientific evidence). 
371. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977). 
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critical. Several initial issues are fairly easy to resolve. First, the proponent of 
the evidence should have the burden of production and persuasion. Second, the 
issue of whether the burden of proof has been satisfied should be decided by the 
judge as a preliminary question of fact. 372 The last, and undoubtedly the most 
difficult, issue is the standard of proof. As an initial proposition, the Frye test 
must be rejected. It is a substantive standard, which functions as an inappropriate 
basis for excluding scientific evidence. Thus, the substitution of a different test, 
whether it be "reasonable scientific acceptance" 373 or "substantial accept-
ance," 374 would be equally inapposite. As was stated in a different context, 
such a change may have "all the vices of novelty and none of the virtues of 
lasting improvement.'' 375 Instead, the admission of scientific evidence should 
be controlled by adjusting the burden of proof. 
Professor Saltzburg has offered a useful analysis of how the standard of 
proof with respeCt to preliminary questions of fact should be determined: 376 
''[A]n enhanced burden of proof [should be required] whenever there is some-
thing extraordinary about a particular kind of fact question or type of evi-
dence." 377 Such an enhanced burden is appropriate when the reliability of a 
particular type of evidence is critical, because "[ w ]hen the purpose of a rule of 
competency is to enhance the reliability of a jury verdict, the greater the risk of 
error in preliminary factfinding, the greater the risk of error in the final judgment 
by the jury.'' 378 Since novel scientific evidence presents significant reliability 
problems that may result in erroneous verdicts, an enhanced burden of proof 
should be required. 379 
372. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). Since the purpose of imposing a special burden on the admissibil-
ity of novel scientific evidence is to insulate the jury from unreliable evidence, treating the issue of 
admissibility as one of conditional relevancy under Fed. R. Evid. l04(b) would undermine that 
purpose. 
373. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 250, at 423; Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 
5, at 1380. See also Commentary to Alaska Rules of Evidence 202-03 (May 1979). 
374. See text accompanying notes 283-84 supra. 
375. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 435, 451 ( 1958). 
376. See Saltzburg, supra note 368. 
377. ld. at 292. 
378. ld. at 291. 
379. The imposition of a special rule for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence would 
not necesssarily represent a departure from traditional evidentiary principles. Under the relevancy 
approach, the validity of a novel technique is analyzed in terms of its probative value. If a technique 
is not valid or reliable, results derived from that technique are not considered probative. See text 
accompanying notes 37-39 and 293 supra. For example, if voiceprint identification is used in a 
kidnapping case to identify the defendant's voice as the one which made the ransom call, the proba-
tive value of the identification would depend upon the reliability of the technique. Framing the issue 
in these terms, however, does not resolve the issue, because the probative value of all evidence 
depends on its reliability. If a witness in the kidnapping case testifies that it was the defendant who 
made the ransom call, the probative value of the evidence also would depend on its reliability-the 
reliability of the witness's identification of the defendant's voice. However, the reliability determina-
tion in such a case is functionally assigned to the jury as a matter of credibility because the jury is 
thought to be especially equipped to make such reliability determinations. 
Hearsay evidence offers another example in which relevancy and reliability are functionally 
distinguished. Although relevant, hearsay evidence is excluded because it is thought to be unreliable. 
In contrast to the credibility of witnesses, however, hearsay is treated as a rule of competence, and 
determinations concerning the applicability of the rule and its exceptions are assigned to the judge 
because it is of "such character as to be incapable of reasonably accurate evaluation and therefore 
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Professor Saltzburg also recognizes that the standard of proof for prelimi-
nary questions of fact may differ in criminal and civil cases. 
Evidentiary rules or principles need not be uniform in civil and 
criminal cases. Since our society has chosen to give criminal defen-
dants the benefit of all reasonable factual doubts-a benefit not usually 
conferred upon civil litigants-rules of evidence may be tailored in a 
principled way to reflect and support this choice. 380 
The prosecution in a criminal case should be required to establish the validity 
of a novel sci!'!ntific technique beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil litigants and 
criminal defendants, on the other hand, should establish the validity of a novel 
technique by a preponderance of the evidence. 381 
Although it imposes an enhanced burden on the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence in criminal cases, this approach uses a traditional burden of proof 
rather than the ambiguous general acceptance standard espoused in Frye. Con-
sequently, many of the problems associated with the application of the Frye test 
would be avoided. Although general acceptance by a recognized discipline or 
profession would be relevant, such acceptance would be neither required nor 
necessarily sufficient. 
The principal criticism of this approach will be that it imposes too high a 
burden on the prosecution. It is clear that such a burden is not impossible to 
satisfy. Fingerprint, firearms, and questioned document comparisons all satisfy 
this burden. Moreover, such a burden would apply only in the initial cases in 
which the technique is offered in evidence and then only to the validity of the 
technique, not to its application on a particular occasion. Once the technique 
likely to mislead the jury." Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Prelimi-
nary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165, 165-66 ( 1929). Novel scientific evidence can be 
viewed in much the same way as hearsay. 
380. Saltzburg, supra note 368, at 304. A number of cases, in applying the Frye standard, have 
emphasized the fact that the case involved a criminal prosecution. See United States v. Brown, 557 
F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[A] strong countervailing restraint on the admission of expert 
testimony is the defendant's right to a fair trial .... "); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 85, 
114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 718-19 (1974) ("It is our duty ... where the life or liberty of a defendant is at 
stake, to be particularly careful that ... the finding is based upon admissible and nonprejudicial 
evidence."); Commonwealth v. Tapa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977) ("Strict 
application of the Frye standard when scientific proof is offered is essential if the defendant is to 
receive a just and fair trial."). 
381. Applying the preponderance standard to scientific evidence offered by a defendant in a crimi-
nal case would avoid any possible constitutional problems. See text accompanying notes 258-64 
supra. 
The preponderance standard would also apply in proceedings other than trial. Novel scientific 
evidence has been introduced in hearings involving the suppression of evidence, sentencing, parole 
and probation revocation, and motions for new trials. See United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (voiceprints admitted in probation revocation proceedings); State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 
546, 521 P.2d 978 (polygraph results admitted at sentencing), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); 
People v. Cutter, 12 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (polygraph results admitted 
at suppression hearing); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979) (polygraph results admissible 
in hearing for a new trial); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977) (polygraph 
results admitted in hearing for new trial); State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213, 278 A.2d 543 
(Hudson County Ct. 1971) (polygraph results admitted at sentencing). See also State ex rei. Trimble 
v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (voiceprints admitted to establish probable 
cause). 
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becomes accepted, the courts could take judicial notice of its validity. Finally, 
such a burden could be satisfied more readily if the limitations of the technique 
are candidly acknowledged. For example, an expert could testify that the paraffin 
test is capable of detecting nitrates, or he could overstate the conclusions that 
can be .drawn from the test by testifying that the test is capable of establishing 
the recent firing of a weapon. The former statement would satisfy the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, the latter would not. 
Still, it may be argued that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard will 
delay for too long a time the admission of evidence based upon novel 
techniques. This, however, will depend on whether the necessary resources are 
expended to validate new techniques. The federal government possesses the 
capability of marshalling those resources, of establishing independent tribunals, 
and of conducting the validating research. As one court, in rejecting voiceprint 
evidence, stated: 
It is certainly reasonable to expect science to withhold judgment on a 
new theory until it has been well tested in the crucible of controlled 
experimentation and study. Such a procedure would require replication 
of original experiments, and scrutiny of the results in various scientific 
journals .... The Tosi [voiceprint] experiment is not so monumental 
that it could be performed but once in a lifetime. 382 
Again, the National Academy of Sciences report is instructive. The evaluation 
of the voiceprint technique conducted by the Academy (at the request of the 
FBI) should have preceded, and not followed, the proffer of voiceprint evidence. 
The adoption of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, of course, would 
not solve all the problems associated with the admissibility of innovative scien-
tific evidence. Difficult questions of application will remain. Courts would still 
have to rely on expert testimony and scientific publications in determining 
whether the reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied. 383 Similarly, careful 
scrutiny of innovative techniques to discern whether they are based on subjective 
rather than objective criteria, 384 or on an unexplained theory supported only by 
empirical validation, would still be required. The availability of alternative 
methods would also have to be considered. 385 Consequently, the procedural 
safeguards considered earlier, 386 a demanding standard for the qualifications of 
382. People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 709-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1978). See 
also D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553,562-63,385 A.2d 278, 283 (Ch. Div. 1978) ("What this 
court finds disconcerting is the paucity of major tests and studies .... But to be assured that we 
have a scientific technique which is valid and reliable we also need something more than the bare 
results of one major study."). 
383. See text accompanying notes 126-50 supra. 
384. In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), the court stressed the superiority of 
the Frye test when considering expert testimony based on subjective criteria. ld. at 388, 391 A.2d at 
371. For a discussion of the difference between objectively and subjectively based results, see Cole-
man & Walls, supra note 349; Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 5, at 1384-85; Comment, The 
Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, supra note l, 1020-25; Note, The Admissibility of 
Bite Mark Evidence, supra note 6, at 329 ("Without statistical background data forming a solid 
objective basis for the odontologist's conclusion, the opinion as to the existence of a [bitemark] 
match is necessarily partly subjective."). 
385. See Latin, Tannehill & White, supra note 5, at 140 I. 
386. See text accompanying notes 322-58 supra. 
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experts, 387 and a strict standard of appellate review, 388 would have to be integral 
parts of such an approach. 
CONCLUSION 
The Frye test, which has cast its shadow over the admissibility of scientific 
evidence for more than a half-century, has proved unworkable. Nevertheless, the 
underlying rationale of the Frye test-requiring evidence derived from newly 
ascertained or applied scientific principles to meet a special burden as a pre-
requisite to admissibility-has merit. The major flaw in the relevancy analysis, 
the principal alternative to Frye, is its failure to recognize the distinctive prob-
lems of scientific evidence. In assessing probative value under this approach, the 
judge frequently is forced to defer to an expert, thereby permitting admissibility 
based on the views of a single individual in some cases. Consequently, voice·-
prints, 38 H the paraffin test, 3 ~ 0 trace metal detection technique, 3 ~ 1 psychological 
stress evaluation, 3 u2 as well as other insufficiently validated techniques 383 may 
readily gain admissibility. 
The proposaJ'set forth in this Articie accepts the premise of F1ye, at least in 
criminal cases, but rejects the standard of Frye. In contrast to the relevancy 
approach, this proposal highlights the unique reliability problems associated with 
the admissibility of innovative scientific procedures and provides a principled 
approach for distinguishing "good" science from ''bad" science. 
387. See text accompanying notes 123-25 and note 299 supra. 
388. See text accompanying notes 187-97 supra. 
389. See United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967) (court did not apply 
Frye and admitted voiceprint evidence before any studies on the subject were published); Worley v. 
State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
390. See cases cited in note 215 supra. 
391. See Reid v. State,. 267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978); State v. Journey, 201 Neb. 607, 
614, 271 N.W.2d 320. 324 (1978); State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4. 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973). 
But see People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (technique rejected 
for failure to satisfy general acceptance standard). See also Stevens & Messler, The Trace Metal 
Detection Technique (TMDT): A Report Outlining a Procedure for Photographing Results in Color, 
and Some Factors Influencing the Results in Controlled Laboratory Tests, 19 J. Forensic Sci. 496 
(1974). 
392. In Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 ( 1976), the court rejected PSE, viewing 
the technique as a type of polygraph. See also Kenety, supra note 7. 
393. Application of the Frye test prevented the introduction into evidence of remote sensing evi-
dence, United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978), and a modified Harrison-Gilroy test 
for gunshot residue, State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976). Undoubtedly 
the admissiblity of these techniques would have been more readily achieved under the relevancy 
approach. 
